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CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE OF OHIO: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
THE SUNDRY CLAIMS BOARD AND THE PROPOSED COURT
OF CLAIMS ACT
Sovereign immunity has long shielded the State of Ohio from suit in
Ohio courts for wrongs committed by the state or its agents. But since
1917 an administrative means of redressing wrongs committed by the
state and enforcing rights against the state has been available in the form
of the Ohio Sundry Claims Board. Although all previous legislative at-
tempts to waive the state's sovereign immunity on a broad scale had been
unsuccessful, in 1973 the House of Representatives passed and sent to
the Senate a bill waiving the State's immunity and granting the right to
proceedoagainst the state in a court of law. The Senate judiciary com-
mittee recommended passage of an amended version, and at the time of
this writing the bill was still awaiting full Senate action. This note will
survey the principle of sovereign immunity in Ohio, examine critically
the present sundry claims procedure, and, finally, analyze the bill pres-
ently pending in the General Assembly.
I. OHIO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. In General
In Ohio, as in most states,' sovereign immunity has two aspects, in
that the state enjoys both immunity from liability2 and immunity from
suit without its consent.3 Immunity from liability means that even if one
is injured by the state, the injury is not a legal wrong and creates no cause
of action against the state; immunity from suit means that state courts
do not have subject matter jurisdiction over any suit instituted against
the state unless a statute expressly provides otherwise. Since both im-
munities shield the state from effective suit, either one can be asserted by
[Editor's Note-On May 29, 1974, as this article went to press, the Ohio Senate passed
the Court of Claims Act by a vote of 23-8. Concurrence by the state House of Reptesenta.
tives followed. The Act will go into effect on January 1, 1975.]
lComment, State Immunity From Suit Without Consent: Scope and Implications, 1971
Wis. L REv. 879, 880. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d
457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) and Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 37, 115 N.W,2d
618 (1962).
2 Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927); Dunn v. Agricultural
Soc'y, 46 Ohio St. 93, 18 N.E. 496 (1888); Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St.
19 (1869).
3 Krau.e v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972); Wolf v. Ohio State
Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E. 2d 475 (1959); State ex rel. Williams v. Glander,
148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1941); Palumbo v. Indus.
Comm'n., 140 Ohio St. 54, 42 N.E.2d 766 (1942); Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 118
N.E. 102 (1917).
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the state as an absolute defense against a plaintiff. Both methods of as-
serting sovereign immunity have been used by the State of Ohio.! Since
subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental to the right of the court to hear
a case, and since it cannot be waived, the parties or the court may at any
time,5 even on appeal, raise the question of the state's immunity from suit
and have the action dismissed, even though oriinally the state had based
its defense on a theory of immunity from liability. Indeed, Ohio case
law is replete with cases where the supreme court has affirmed a trial
court's dismissal for failure to state a cause of action on the express ground
that the state is not subject to suit without its consent.0
The state's sovereign immunity protects all its departments agencies
and instrumentalities against suit unless the state has given its statutory
consent. It is axiomatic that a suit against a department of the state
government is a suit against the state itself.- State universities, state hos-
pitals, public boards of education, state or local governmental units, and,
in certain instances, municipal corporations are agencies or instrumental-
ities of the state and are thus protected by sovereign immunity because,
in the words of the supreme court, "A suit against a public corporation
having no powers other than the performance of a function of the gov-
ernment and accomplishing no other object, is plainly a suit against the
government and its property, although nominally it is a suit against the
corporation only."" Counties, townships, and other public corporations
4 E.g., Wolf v. Ohio Sr. Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio S. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959) (demur-
rer); Thacker v. Board of Trustees, 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 298 N.E.2d 542 (1973) (motion
to dismiss for failing to state a daim upon which relief could be granted); Krause v. State,
31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972) (motion to quash service of summons).
5 Omo R_ Civ. P. 12(H).
IE.g., Thacker v. Board of Trustees, 35 Ohio Sr. 2d 49, 298 N.E.2d 542 (1973); Wolf
v. Ohio Sr. Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E. 2d 475 (1959); State ex rel. villiam
v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947); Palumbo v.
Indus. Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 54, 42 N.E2d 766 (1942).
Another theory which would explain the results in these cases is that immunity from
suit creates an immunity from liability, coextensive with and dependent upon the immunity
from suit. The term "cause of action" denotes a set of circumstances constituting an injury
for which the courts give redress. If a set of circumstances includes the circumsnce that
the state is the defendant, then, because of immunity from suit, courts do not give relief
for the injury shown by that set of circumstances, and therefore the set of circumstances
does not show a cause of action. Because this is so whenever the state is the defendant
and has not waived its immunity from suit, it may be said that an immunity from liability
derives from the immunity from suit in all cases, and thus that a demurrer or motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should be sustained
when the state has not waived its immunity from suit.
7West Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Masheter, 6 Ohio Sr. 2d 142, 216 N.Y.2d 761
(1966); Palumbo v. Indus. Comm'n., 140 Ohio St. 54, 42 N.E.2d 766 (1947); State ex
rel. Clark v. Dept. of Mental Hygiene & Correction, 72 Ohio L Abs. 340, 135 N.E.2d 72
(Cr. App. Franklin.Cty. 1955).
8 Overholser v. National Home, 68 Ohio St. 236, 248, 67 N.E 487, 489 (1903). See
also Thacker v. Bd. of Trustees, 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 298 N.E.2d 542 (1973) (Ohio State
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which are merely territorial and political subdivisions of the state are
"clothed with tie same immunity from liability as the state itself,",
Several state instrumentalities, agencies, and political subdivisions
have been given the power "to sue and to be sued" by the statutes crea-
ting them. Thus to some extent the sovereign immunity of these entities
has been waived by statute. However, such statutes have uniformly been
interpreted by the supreme court to grant the state's consent to suit, and
thus to waive immunity from liability, only as to such matters as are
within the scope of the other corporate powers of the entities, Conse-
quently, those statutes do not, for example, authorize suit or create liabil-
ity for torts,10 because, the court has said, the entities were not authorized
to commit torts and it was not contemplated that they would do so."
Entities with the power "to sue and to be sued" may be sued in contract
if they were given the power to enter contracts in order to carry out their
purposes, but they cannot be sued for negligence.
The application of sovereign immunity to local political entities is
somewhat more complex. Ohio law has distinguished between munici-
pal corporations and purely political subdivisions of the state, such as
counties and townships. The latter are regarded as "quasi-corporations"
because few corporate powers are conferred on them, while municipal-
ities are regarded as corporations in the true sense of the word because
University and Ohio State University Hospitals, as instrumentalities of the state, are not
subject to suit in tort); Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.I.2d
475 (1959) (some holding as in Thacker); Wayman v. BoArd of Educ. 5 Ohio St. 2d 248,
215 N.E.2d 394 (1966) (A board of education acts as one of the state's ministerial educa.
tional agencies, and a suit against the board is a suit against the government and its property):
Schaffer v. Board of Trustees, 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960) (A county and
its agencies are instrumentalities of the state and are immune to a suit for negligence);
Broughton v. Cleveland, 167 Ohio St. 29, 146 N.E.2d 301 (1957) (When engaged In
a governmental function, a "municipality becomes an arm of sovereignty and a governmental
agency" entitled to the state's sovereign immunity). In Palumbo v. Industrial Commission,
140 Ohio St 54, 42 N.E.2d 766 (1962), the supreme court held that in the absence of a
-special statute allowing a garnishment proceeding against the state, the wages of an employee
of the state Industrial Commission could not be garnished because, although the state would
not have to pay any of its money except that owed to the judgment debtor if all went
well, the state might be subject to liability if state officials paid the wages over to the
judgment debtor in violation of the court's judgment. On the other hand, in American
Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Kentucky v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 NXE.2d 301 (1949),
the supreme court ruled that a declaratory judgment action by an insurance company against
the administrator of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, to declare and determine
the rights and status of the insurance company under the unemployment compensation act,
was not a suit against the state because the declaratory judgment sought would affect only
funds which belonged to the insurance company.
9 Dunn v. Agricultural Soc'y, 46 Ohio St. 93, 97, 18 N.E. 496, 497-98 (1888).
1OWolf v. Ohio St. Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959); Overholser
v. National Home, 68 Ohio St. 236, 67 N.E. 487 (1903); Board of Educ. v. Volk, 72 Ohio
St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905); Finch v. Board of Educ., 30 Ohio St. 37 (1876); Board of
Comm'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857).
11 Overholser v. National Home, 68 Ohio St. 236, 250, 67 N.E. 487, 490 (1903).
of their extensive corporate powers." Counties are protected in all of
their functions by sovereign immunity, except to the extent that immu-
nity has been waived by statute.13 Municipalities, however, are not so fully
protected.
Since 1854 the Ohio Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions of municipal corporations."
When a function of the city is governmental, the city is regarded as an
agent of the state government and is protected by the state's sovereign
immunity. But when the function is classified as proprietary, the action
is regarded as performed "in pursuit of private and corporate duties, for
the particular benefit of the corporation and its inhabitants, as distin-
guished from those things in which the whole state has an interest," and
the municipality is subject to liability for wrongs committed in the course
of the function.'- While the governmental-proprietary distinction has
not always been easy to apply, 0 it has been maintained in Ohio law ex-
cept for a brief period from 1919 to 1922.17
When neither the state nor any other entity clothed with the sovereign
immunity of the state is the nominal defendant in an action, the action is
nevertheless regarded as one against the state if the state is the real party
in interest, that is, if the liability sought to be established is that of the
state." If the rights of the state would be directly and adversely affected
by the judgment or decree sought in an action against a state official, the
12 Schaffer v. Board of Trustees, 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960); Board of
Comm'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857).
13 Schaffer v. Board of Trustees, 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.F.2d 547 (1960).
14 Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St 80 (1854).
'
5 Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 387, 189 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1963); Wooster v.
Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281,283, 156 N.E. 210,211 (1927).
'
6 Lists of the various tests are contained in Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 338,
189 N.E.2d 857, 860-861 (1963) and Woos.er v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 284, 156
N.E.2d 210, 211-212 (1927). As is pointed out in Justice Gibson's concurring opinion in
Hack v. Salem, the supreme court has at different times reached inconsistent or opposite re-
sults as to the class in which a particular function is to be placed. The trend in recent deci-
sions has been to narrow the scope of the class of governmental functions of municipalities.
See Sears v. Cindnnati, 31 Ohio St. 2d 157, 285 N.E.2d 732 (1972) in which the Ohio
Supreme Court removed the defense of governmental immunity from municipally owned
hospitals because municipalities have no statutorily imposed duty to own or operate a hospital
and because the maintenance of a hospital is not essential to the government of a munid-
pality.
1'Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919); ovnuled, Aldrich v.
Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
1 8 State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82 (1947); Reed
v. Timberman, 65 Ohio App. 182, 29 N.E.2d 446, appeal dismissed, 137 Ohio St. 524,
30 N.E.2d 993 (1940); State ex rel. Board of County Comm'rs v. Rhodes, 86 Ohio L Abs.
390, 177 N.E2d 557 (C.P. Franklin Cry. 1960); Ley v. Kirdey, 5 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529,
18 Ohio Dec. 280 (C.P. Summit Cry. 1907).
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suit is barred by sovereign immunity unless the state has consented to
suit. 9
If the relief sought in an action against a state officer is such that it
could operate to control the actions of the state or subject the state to lia-
bility, the suit is regarded as one against the state although the relief may
be nominally directed against the defendant as an individual.2  A suit
may be maintained against a state officer, however, in which equitable re-
lief is sought to restrain him from acting in violation of a statute,21 or
in excess of his powers,22 or to restrain him from enforcing a statute
claimed to be unconstitutional, 23 or to compel him to perform a duty im-
posed on him by statute. -4 In such cases the suits are regarded as being
against the official as an individual, rather than against the state.
There is, however, at least one exception to the state's sovereign im.
munity which will permit suit to lie against state officers, state agencies
and the state itself. In Wayman v. Board of Education,21 the supreme
court ruled that an injunction could be obtained against a board of edu-
cation which creates or maintains a nuisance on its property in such a
manner that the property of the plaintiff is endangered or injured. Al-
though no suit would lie in tort for damages caused by such a nuisance,
the creation or maintenance of the nuisance could be enjoined. Thus,
courts will protect a plaintiff against present active wrongdoing by the
state or its agencies, although redress for injuries already perpetrated can-
not be had through the courts.
B. Common Law Sovereign Immunity in Ohio
Sovereign immunity in Ohio was originally a judicially created doc.
19 State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82 (1947). See
also West Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Masheter, 6 Ohio St. 2d 142, 216 N.E.2d 761
(1966), in which the court held that an action against the Director of Highways to quiet
title to property in which the state had an easement for roadside park purposes could not
be maintained without the state's consent becaue the state was the real party in interest.
20 State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 173 Ohio St. 203, 181 N.E.2d 31 (1962); State
ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82 (1947); Ley Y. Kfrtlcy,
5 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529, 18 Ohio Dec. 280 (C.P. Summit Cvt. 1907).
21 Columbia Life Ins. Co. v. Hess, 28 Ohio App. 107, 162 N.E. 466 (Ct. App. Hamilton
Cry. 1926), aff'd, 116 Ohio St. 416, 156 N.E. 504 (1927).
2 2 American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 53 Ohio L Abs. 161, 83 N".2d 408
(Cc. App. Franklin Cty. 1948), modified on reheating, 53 Ohio L Abs. 412, 85 N.E.2d 593
(1948), afJ'd, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949).
2 3 Baldwin Forging & Tool Co. v. Griffith, 5 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 566, 18 Ohio Dec. 261
(C.P. Franklin Cry. 1907).
2 4 State ex rel. Nichols v. Gregory, 130 Ohio St. 165, 198 N.E. 182 (1935); Shade v,
Ferguson, 44 Ohio 1. Abs. 332, 62 N.E.2d 642 (Ct. App. Franklin Cty. 1945).
25 5 Ohio St. 2d 248,215 N.E.2d 394 (1966).
20 Id.; Board of Educ. v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905).
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trine."' The constitutions of 1803 and 1851 made no mention of sover-
eign immunity, and no statutes covered the subject. However, case law
shows that the doctrine existed in Ohio as early as 184 0,'" and statutes
granting consent to suit imply that it existed even earlier. "' No supreme
court opinion expressly adopted or created the doctrine. Rather, when
the doctrine appeared in opinions of the supreme court, it was as an es-
tablished, settled principle which the court apparently thought needed
neither comment, justification, nor explanation. 0 The doctrine thus ap-
pears to have been adopted long before these opinions, probably along
with the adoption of the English common law in the time of the creation
of the Northwest Territories. "'
The Ohio Supreme Court has, at different times, given various expla-
nations for the basis for sovereign immunity in Ohio. Perhaps the earliest
explanation of the doctrine in supreme court opinions appeared in Day-
ton v. Pease,32 in which the court based the doctrine on a policy decision
2 7 Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972); Schaffer v. Board of Trus-
tees, 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960).
2 8 State v. Franklin Bank, 10 Ohio 91 (1840) involved a suit by the state against a bank
for back taxes owed from a previous year. The bank claimed a right to a refund from an-
other year in an amount greater than the amount owed. When requested to render judgment
against the state for the difference, the supreme court declared simply, "This we cannot do,"
without elaborating, Id. at 100. The syllabus of the case reads in pertinent part: "No judg-
ment can be rendered against the state."
In a civil action, the defendant may set off a debt due to him from the state." Sover-
eign immunity was obviously the basis of the courts holding. However, the granting of the
setoff suggests that the state was liable for the excess of the refund claimed over the amount
owed.
In Miers v. Zanesville and Marysville Turnpike Co., 11 Ohio 273, 274 (1842). regarding
sovereign immunity, the court said only: "To so much of the bill as assumes to compel the
state to pay arrearages of its subscription, it is plain that no answer need be made; it is
enough to say that the state is not, in fact, a party, and is not capable of being made a party
defendant." The syllabus reads in pertinent part- "No suit lies against the state to compel the
payment of subscription to stock."
29 E.g., An Act to carry into effect the acts heretofore passed for the relief of James
Hampson and John S. Parkinson, 36 Ohio Laws (Local) 169 (1838), construed in Hampsoa
and Parkinson v. State, 8 Ohio 315 (1838); An Act for the relief of Morris Seely, 36
Ohio Laws (Local) 220 (1839), construed in Seely v. State, 11 Ohio 501 (1842), af'd on re-
hearing, 12 Ohio 496 (1843). The fact that it was necessary for the General Assembly to
pass special statutes in order to allow claimants to seek redress in the courts indicates that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity already at that time precluded suits against the state without
its consent.
So See note 27, supra.
31The English common law was introduced in Ohio in 1795, prior to statehood, in a
law adopted by the Governor and judges of the Northwest Territory pursuant to authority
given them by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. LAWS OF THE TERRTORY Or THE UNITED
STATE-s NORTH-WEST. Although it was repealed on January 2, 1806 (4 Ohio Laws 38), the
English common law is still a part of the common law of Ohio "so far as it is reasonable in
itself, suitable to the condition and business of our people, and consistent with the letter and
spirit of our federal and state constitutions and statutes . . ." Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St.
387, 390 (1853).
324 Ohio St. 80 (1854).
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that redress against the state should be a matter of legislative grace rather
than a matter of right in the courts. In a later case, State ex rel. Parrott
v. Board of Public Works,33 the court relied on the common law doctrine
that "The King is not bound by any statute, if he be not expressly named
to be so bound," stating that the maxim applied "to states in this coun.
try as well ... because it must be assumed that the state will ever be ready
and willing to act justly toward its citizens in the absence of statutes or
the intervention of courts. ' 4 Only once (and then only in passing) has
the supreme court found the origin of Ohio sovereign immunity in the
often-cited ancient maxim "the King can do no wrong." Since this maxim
is widely regarded as being misstated and misunderstood, the court's lack
of reliance on it appears to be well founded. 5
33 36 Ohio St. 409 (1881).
34 Id. at 414-15.
This rule of statutory construction, that the state is not bound by a general statute
unless it is expressly named in it, provides an explanation for immunity from liability as
well as immunity from suit. It appears to be the main reason why the courts have not
found general jurisidictional and procedural statutes to be consents to suit, and thus it Is
one of the main reasons why the doctrine of sovereign immunity exists in Ohio today.
In Palumbo v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 54, 42 NE.2d 766 (1942), the supreme
court stated that the state's consent to suit must be express, not implied, -citing the ParrotS
case and the legal maxim quoted in it. Although this general rule of construction would
be sufficient in itself to preclude the state from liability on causes of action based upon
statutes not expressly including the state, it has a broader impact. Because Ohio trial courts
have only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon them by the Constitution or statutes, Hum.
phrys v. Putnam, 172 Ohio St. 456, 178 N.E.2d 506 (1961), a general jurisdictional statute
would not give a court jurisdiction of an action against the state.
35See, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961); Thacker v Board of Trustees, 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 73-75, 298 N,.l2d 542,
556-57 (1973) (Brown, J., dissenting); Comment, Ohio Sovereign Immunity' Long Lvet
the King, 28 OHIo ST. L. J. 75 (1969). See also the Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant
at 31 n.2, Krause v. State, 31 Ohio Sr. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), where counsel
for the state wrote:
Interestingly enough, the concept that "the King can do no wrong" did not
arise until centuries after the doctrine of sovereign immunity had introduced itself
into European jurisprudence. It was early recognized that the King could act Il.
legally and there was "a definite legal remedy against the crown"-the petition of
right. 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 16 (1926). See generally pp. 7.43.
The petition was regarded not as a matter of grace, but as a true legal remedy, and
the difference between it and a court action against the King was "only in the form,
not in the thing." Justice Wilson in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2. U.S. (2 Dal.) 419,
459, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793).
The Tudor and Stuart lawyers, eager to enhance the power of the King, gave a
new twist to the established maxim that the King could not be sued, and introduced
in English law the theory of an absolute monarchy, independent of and unttam.
melled by the law. 9 Holsworth, History of English Law 4-7 (1926). It was this
era, replete with heated confrontations between Henry VIII and the Church of
Rome, which gave voice to the ill-famed doctrine that "the King can do no wrong."
In actuality, this theory was dealt its death blow and should have been laid to rest
when Parliament forced Charles II to grant a petition of right-the Petitiorn of
Right of 1628, in which Charles recognized that he was bound to respect the legal
rights of his subjects. Adams, Constitutional History of England 293-297 (2nd Ed.
1934). Some of the parliamentary lawyers, however, notably Blackstone, simply
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It was not until Krause v. State,0 in 1972, that the supreme court ar-
ticulated what must have long been a prime consideration in the court's
reluctance to abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity: the constitu-
tional separation of powers which gives the legislature the sole power to
appropriate funds." If the courts were to discard sovereign immunity on
their own, without provision being made by the legislature for payment
of the judgments, "courts would render judgments which would be
constitutionally uncollectible unless or until the General Assembly made
an appropriation, or the plaintiff brought suit, in aid of execution, against
the General Assembly.138  The result would be a confrontation between
the separate and coequal branches of the state government, with the
courts arguably invading the exclusive province of the legislature. Avoid-
ance of the possibility of such a clash is the soundest reason for the con-
tinuance of sovereign immunity in the absence of consent to suit by the
legislature.
C. Remedies Against the State of Ohio before 1917
and Article I, § 16 of the Ohio Constitution
Prior to the establishment of the sundry claims procedure in 1917, if
a person felt aggrieved by the state in some way, the only remedy avail-
able was a petition to the legislature for redress. If the General Assem-
bly was persuaded of the merit of the claim, it would pass a special stat-
ute. Generally such statutes would do one of three things: (1) author-
ize or order the state treasurer 9 or treasurer of the political subdivision
involved to pay the amount claimed; 40 (2) authorize or require agencies
with special funds to investigate the claim and pay any amount found
due;4' or (3) grant special permission to the claimant to sue the state in
a court of law 2 Special statutes granting consent to sue the state were
transferred the seat of absolutism from King to Parliament, See Cbhiolm, supra, 2
U.S. at 462. And our law has ever since been troubled by a confusion between the
theory of sovereign immunity from suit, and the theory that the sovereign is abso-
lute and independent of the law.
30 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 143,285 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1972).
3 7 Ohio Const. art II, § 22 provides in pertinent part: "No money shall be drawn from
the treasury, except in pursuance of a specific appropriation, made by law..
38 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 143, 285 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1972).
39 E.g., An Act for the relief of Caleb Atwater, 36 Ohio Laws (Local) 305 (1838).
40 E.g., An Act for the relief of Rezia Arnold, 22 Ohio Laws (Local) 83 (1824) (requir-
ing the treasurer of Harrison County to pay not more than $75 to Rezin Arnold for services
rendered in the case of Ohio v. John Wallace).
4 1 E.g., An Act for the relief of James Hampson and John S. Parkinson, 33 Ohio Laws
(Local) 309 (1835).
4 2 E.g., An Act for the relief of Morris Seely, 37 Ohio Laws (Local) 220 (1839), con-
strued it; Seely v. State, 11 Ohio 501 (1842), aff'd on rehearing, 12 Ohio 496 (1843); An
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rare and were interpreted variously depending upon their specific lan-
guage.43 When relief was sought by means of special claims statutes
the claims generally were first submitted to the finance committee of the
legislature and then, if approved, were subject to legislative and executive
approval or disapproval in the same manner as other bills.
This system often depended upon the influence of the claimant or the
sympathy which he could arouse. It was open to much abuse and was
openly criticized at the Ohio Constitutional Conventions of 1850 and
1912.44  The 1912 Convention voted to propose an amendment to arti-
cle I, § 16 of the Ohio constitution by adding that "Suits may be brought
against the state, in such courts and in such manner as may be provided
by law."'45 The amendment was approved by the voters at a special elec-
tion held in 1912.
In 1917, in Raudabaugh v. State,46 the supreme court held that the
Act for leave to sue the state of Ohio, to adjudicate a claim of Miss Ellen Hunt, 102
Ohio Laws (Local) 174 (1911), construed in Hunt v. State, 20 Ohio C.C.R. (ns.) 111
(Cir. Ct. Cuyahoga Cry.) aff'd, 88 Ohio St. 599, 106 N.E. 1062 (1912).
43 One statute provided that the "suit in chancery, . . . , shall be investigated and decided
by said court upon the principles of justice and good faith, and upon the final hearing
of the cause, upon the princip!es aforesaid, the court shall render such decree as, In their
opinion, the principles of justice and good faith demand." An Act for the relief of Morris
Seely, 37 Ohio Laws (Local) 220 (1839). This statute was interpreted by the supreme
court not to require that the plaintiff establish a legal or equitable right to relief, but
to place his right to relief on "the principles of a more enlarged rule of moral right,
untrammeled by technical rules." Seely v. State, 11 Ohio 501, 506 (1842), aff'd on rehear.
ing, 12 Ohio 496 (1843). On the other hand, a much later statute which merely provided
that the plaintiff "is hereby permitted and empowered to commence an action in the Court
of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County against the state of Ohio, that the said claim ..
may be properly determined," An Act for Leave to sue the state of Ohio, to adjudicate
a claim of Miss Ellen Hunt, 102 Ohio Laws (Local) 174 (1911), was interpreted by the
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals to require that the validity of the plaintiff's claim
be "determined by reference to established legal principles." Hunt v. State, 20 Ohio C.CR.
(n.s.) 111, 112 (Cir. Ct. Cuyahoga Cry. 1912).
44At the 1850 Convention one delegate said:
We are all aware that claims are submitted to the legislature, about which we
have no means of ascertaining whether they are correct or not, because the evidence
we have is merely ex parte. The allowances depend generally more upon the men
who advance the claims than the justice of the claim;. . . .Claims have been
brought here which parties would never think of applying to a court to enforce....
Of all bodies in the world the Legislature is the poorest to settle disputes about
claims.
1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVE3NTION OF 1850 297
(1850).
At the 1912 convention another delegate characterized adjustment of claims by the legis-
lature as "a settlement based upon charity and doubt" and questioned, "why should the
legislature appropriate the peoples' money in settlement of claims against the state of dubious
and uncertain origin and without the intervention of the courts?" 2 PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE Ot OHIO 1431 (1912).
452 PRoCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF TI1
STATE OF Orno 1431 (1912).
4696 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917).
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amendment is not self-executing and that until the legislature enacts a
statute expressly granting consent to suit, the state is not subject to suit
in Ohio courts.47 In 1972, this interpretation was reaffirmed by the court
in Krause v. State.48 The legislature's consent to suit, the court said in
Krause, "is manifest when it designates, by law, the courts and the
manner in which such suits may be brought."49
Implicit in the supreme court's opinions in Raudabaugh and Krause
is the notion that the grant of power to designate the courts in which
suits may be brought also includes the right not to exercise that power.
That right amounts to a legislative veto over the right to sue the state
granted by the amendment. Thus Ohio courts are without power to
abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, " though it may be waived
totally or partially by the legislature at any time. "[S]overeign immunity
exists in Ohio, insofar as suits against the state are concerned, only be-
cause the constitutional requirement for legislative consent in the field
has not yet been satisfied."'"
47 Although the result of the decision, continuation of sovereign immunity, is open to
criticism; the decision follows logically from the language of the constitution. A constitu-
tional provision is self-executing if its terms indicate that it is operative without supplemental
or enabling legislation, State ex rel. Russell v. Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 101 N.E.2d 289(1951), that is, if it provides the means by which the right given may be enforced, Strange
v. Cleveland, 94 Ohio St. 377, 144 N.E. 266 (1916). The supreme court's conclusion
that the 1912 amendment is not self-executing follows from the definition of self-executing,
since the provision's reference to "such courts and such manner as may be provided by
law" makes it cdear that the framers envisioned legislation to designate the courts having
jurisdiction over such suits and to prescribe the procedure for bringing such suits. So
until the legislature produces such legislation, no courts have jurisdiction over suits against
the state, and no such suits may be brought.
48 31 Ohio St. 2d 132,285 N.E.2d 736 (1972).
4931 Ohio St. 2d at 144, 285 N.E.2d at 743.
50 Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972); Schaffer v. id. of Trus-
tees, 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960).
5 t Thacker v. Bd. of Trustees, 35 Ohio Sr. 2d 49, 54, 298 N.Y.2d 542, 545 (1973). One
may logically question why the framers of the 1912 constitutional amendment proposed
it at all if it had no practical effect on the law except to elevate the state's immunity
to a constitutional principle voidable at the -legislature's will. The answer is found in the
concepts of constitutional law which were voiced at the 1912 constitutional convention, but
which were never adopted by the courts of Ohio. The major proponent of the amendment,
in a long speech at the convention, cited a treatise by Judge Cooley, a constitutional law
scholar of the late 19th century, from which the delegate concluded that the legislature
needed constitutional authority to "enact laws that seek to nullify the immemorial rights
of sovereignty" such as sovereign immunity. 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEDATES OF THE CON-
STITuTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIo 1431 (1912). At the time, there
was a school of thought which considered sovereign immunity an inherent right of the sover-
eign, the sovereign being not the legislature but the people, and maintained that the legisla-
ture needed a constitutional grant of power from the people in order to allow suits against
the state without the legislature's consent to each individual suit. It was thought that the
legislature could grant the state's consent to individual suits, but that it could not do away
with the requirement for consent to each suit by granting a court continuing jurisdiction
over such suits, without first being constitutionally empowered to do so. Since sovereign
immunity was considered an inherent right of the people and not as a judicial doctrine
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II. THE SUNDRY CLAIMS BOARD
Shortly after the 1912 ratification of the amendment to article I, § 16
of the Ohio constitution, the legislature attempted to implement it by
considering broad consent statutes. One such statute passed the General
Assembly, but was vetoed by the governor.52 Three others were rejected
by the legislature."3 Against this background the General Assembly in
1917 enacted what is now Ohio Revised Code § 127.11, which created
the Sundry Claims Board and empowered it to hear And approve claims
against the state.54 This portion of the note will discuss the present
practices and procedure of the Board in order to better analyze the pro-
visions of the proposed Court of Claims Act. 5
A. The Composition of the Board
According to the statute establishing it, the Sundry Claims Board con-
sists of five members: the state auditor, the attorney general, the chair-
man of the House finance committee, the chairman of the Senate
finance committee, and the director of the state office of budget and
management or an employee appointed by him. 0 The statutory mem-
bers seldom sit in person. Instead they designate representatives to sit
in their place,57 with these representatives often changing from hear.
which could be abrogated on policy grounds, the framers of the 1912 amendment had
no idea that they were making the doctrine any more invulnerable than it already was
when they granted the legislature the power to provide for suits against the state, a power
intended to facilitate the waiver of sovereign immunity. The Ohio Supreme Court has
referred to this method of granting the power to the legislature as "the prevailing constitu-
tional procedure at that time." Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 131, 138, 285 N.E.2d
736, 740 (1972).52 H.B. 382 passed unanimously in the House, 102 O;HIO H. JOUR, 1178.79 (April
18, 1913), and in the Senate, 103 OHIO S. JOUR. 767 (April 18, 1913), but was vetoed
by Governor Cox because he thought it "a crudely drawn and unwise piece of legislation."
Ohio Hist. Soc'y Arch., Gov. Papers, Gov. Cox's Veto Message (May 2, 1913). The General
Assembly never got a chance to override the veto since it had adjourned for the year on
April 18.
53 H.B. 382 which was introduced February 17, 1913, apparently died in the committee
to which it was assigned. 103 OHIo H. JOUR. 1498 (1913). H.B. 32 which was introduced
on Januery 14, 1915, also apparently died in the committee to which it was assigned. 106
OHIO H. JoUR. 1610 (1915). H.B. 107 which was introduced January 20, 1915 was
indefinitely'postponed on February 4, 1915. 106 OHIo H. JOUR. 169 (Feb. 4, 1915),
5 107 Ohio Law 532 (1917).
55This portion of the note draws upon the familiarity of one of the authors, Thomas
Kahle, with the workings of the Sundry Claims Board gained by working as clerk to the
Board. The authors are also indebted to Charles Whetstone, a former Law Journal staff
member and also a former clerk to the Sundry Claims Board, for his initial research and
ideas on this topic which have been incorporated in this note.
56OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 127.11 (Page 1969). In 1973, the Department of Finance
was changed to the Office of Budget and Management and all references in the statute have
been changed by the legislature to reflect this.
STThe chairmen of the House. and Senate finance committees sometimes sit in person,
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ing to hearing."' Thus it is uncommon for the same five members to act
for consecutive hearings and, consequently, for any one member other
than the president to develop substantial experience."" The custom of
designating alternates is especially awkward when the board hears com-
plicated claims requiring several days for a full hearing or when a claim
is continued for submission of briefs. 0 In such cases the members who
vote on the claim may be different than the members who attended the
hearing or who read the briefs. Even, the "proxy" procedure sometimes
used in such cases hardly serves to correct the deficiency."'
The statutory membership itself creates more subtle problems. All
of the members are in some respect political, either because they are
elected officials themselves or because they are selected, directly or in-
directly, by elected officials. "' Moreover four of the five members are
among those officials most concerned with guarding the expenditure of
public funds. This has been seen as an effort to cut down the amount
and number of damage awards.'0 While the fifth member (the Attor-
ney General) is not directly connected with fiscal matters, his participa-
tion in Board hearings represents another problem. The Attorney Gen-
eral's office represents the state's interest in any legal proceeding which
involves the state.64 This includes defending the state before the Sundry
Claims Board. Thus the representative of the Attorney General sits in
judgment on the presentation made by a co-worker in the same office.
but the auditor and attorney general never do. The director of the Office of Budget and
Management appoints one person who always sits. In 1963 the statute was modified to per-
mit alternative members to be appointed for the chairmen of the House and Senate finance
committees. 130 Ohio Law 58 (1963). However, the statute contains no such authorization
for the auditor and attorney general. Despite the lack of statutory authorization the practice
appears to be one of long standing and has not been challenged.
58 On occasion the composition of the Board has changed even during a hearing.
-9 In May 1973 while testifying on the bill, the President of the Sundry Claims Board
stated that although he had only a little over a year's experience on the Board, that short
length of time gave him more experience than any other Board member except the auditores
representative. Statement of Joel S. Taylor, President of the Ohio Sundry Claims Board,
on House Bill No. 800, before the judiciary committee of the Ohio House of Representa-
tives, May 30, 1973, at 3. [Hereinafter cited as Statement of Joel S. Taylor.]
60 Statement of Joel S. Taylor at 4.
61Because an alternate member did not hear *the evidence on a particular claim he
is incapable of contributing to the Board's deliberation in a meaningful way. Moreover,
because he is just a "proxy" there is little possibility that he may be persuaded to change
his vote even where the person for whom he sits would have been willing to do so.
6 2 Administrative claims boards frequently are criticized because it is felt that their awards
are influenced by political pressure. See, e.g., Oberst, The Board Of Claims Act of 1950,
39 KY. LJ. 35,41 (1950); 44 HARV. L REv. 432,435 (1931).
Ca Comment, Ohio Sovereign Immunity. Long Lives the King, 28 Omo ST. LJ. 75,
87 (1968).
64 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (Page 1972).
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This may put the claimant at a subtle disadvantage when close questions
are before the Board.
In addition to causing a possible bias against the claimant and in favor
of the state, the other full-time duties of the Board members give "Board
proceedings a part time quality which must detract from just decision
making."0' 5 The Board members "can never devote the time to [claims)
which would be done by a court."08 This overload of responsibilities
has lead to a situation in which not all the members are fully prepared
for the hearings. Often members can be seen reading the claim forms or
briefs for the first time at the hearing itself.
The other full-time duties of the Board members reflect one addi-
tional shortcoming. Although the Board purports to make decisions on
solely legal considerations there is no requirement that Board members
be legally trained.' Thus members of the Sundry Claims Board may be
incompetent even to understand a sophisticated legal argument, much
less to apply it properly to the facts before them.
B. Jurisdiction of the Board
The Sundry Claims statute empowers the Board to entertain "claims
against the state," a phrase which has created serious jurisdictional prob-
lems and uncertainties. The primary limitation of this phrase concerns
its application to local political subdivisions of the state. The Board has
consistently held that it has no jurisdiction over such local units as school
districts, conservation districts, and so forth. "8 'This interpretation of the
statute has been based primarily on the assumption that, since Sundry
Claims awards are paid only from funds in .the state treasury, the legis-
lature must not have intended that these funds be used to pay for wrongs
committed by local political units, which are separately funded. Since
'r Statement of Joel S. Taylor at 4.
Gold. at 3.
67 Although the President of the Board has traditionally been an attorney, only the repre.
sentative of the attorney general will definitely be legally trained. He "was added to
the Board, no doubt, to protect against the embarrassment of making awards where the
legal grounds were thin." Id. at 3.
68 See Sundry Claim No. 15124, Rickie Lee Green (August 17, 1973), and the claims
cited therein.
09This view is supported by legislative action in other areas. Various Ohio statutes
provide that counties may under certain circumstances be held liable at law for damages
caused by them, and these statutes place the responsibility for payment of damages on the
counties themselves. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 305.12 (Page 1953) (bridge maintenance);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 307.47 (Page 1953) (certain damage by county police officers).
On occasion special legislation has passed requiring certain counties to reimburse from their
own funds a citizen injured by the county's negligence. E.g., 112 Ohio Laws 102 (1927),
construed in Spitzig.v. State ex rel. Hile, 119 Ohio St. 117, 162 N.E. 394 (1928), It
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these units are not subject to state executive control and would not have
to pay the awards, there would be no reason for the local units to curb
their negligent behavior or to defend their action before the Board. 0
The only court case concerning the Board's jurisdiction appears to af-
firm this limitation on the Board's power to review the tortious acts of
local political units which are otherwise immune from liability.71
The limitation of the Board's jurisdiction to "claims against the
state" forces the parties into multiple litigation in cases in which there
are more claims involved than the one asserted by the claimant. For in-
stance, it deprives the state of the right to counterclaim against the claim-
ant, or to implead third parties, since the use of counterclaims or third-
party practice would require the Board to pass on legal duties of parties
other than the state, parties over whom the Board has no jurisdiction.27
Consequently, this limitation will sometimes force the state to be a de-
fendant before the Board and then to become a plaintiff in a separate ac-
tion in a court of law.
C. Sundry Claims Board Procedure
The Board is empowered to receive "papers representing claims again
the state."7 Presently the Board implements this provision by receiving
daims on a special form, forwarding one copy of the claim to the state
agency involved, and requesting that the "defendant" agency investi-
should also be noted that the state is generally forbidden to assume the debts of any county,
city, town, township or corporation by article VIII, § 5 of the Ohio Constitution.
70 See Sundry Claim No. 15124, Rickie Lee Green (August 17, 1973) at 3-4.
7 1 In 1973, a mandamus action was filed in the Ohio Supreme Court to compel the
Board to take jurisdiction of a claim involving a local school district. State ex rel. Rickie
Lee Green v. Sundry Claims Bd., No. 73-767 (Ohio Sup. Ct., Dec. 13, 1973). In support
of its motion to dismiss, the state argued in the alternative (1) that a claim against a
municipal board of education is not a "claim against the state" under the terms of the
sundry claims statute and (2) that the sundry claims statute, by providing that the Board
"may receive original papers representing claims against the state" (emphasis supplied), iM-
poses only a permissive and discretionary jurisdiction upon the Board and not a mandatory
obligation to consider any particular claim against the state. Memorandum in Support of
Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The supreme court granted the state's motion to dismiss,
stating only that the "plaintiff does not show any dear legal duty on defendants to act."
However, the court did not specify whether the finding of no dear legal duty was based on
a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Board or on a grant of discretion in the statute. While
this ambiguity deprives the case of any broad value as a precedent, it does make it dear that
the Board does not have to consider claims against local political entities. Thus, the decision
leaves those injured by certain negligent acts of such entities without any effective recourse.
72 Counsel for the state once urged the Board to accept the principle of setoff. Although
the application of this principle results only in a reduction of the state's liability rather
than in an affirmative award against the state, the Board refused to consider setoffs for the
same reason that it does not permit counterclaims or third-party practice. Sundry Claim
No. 14528, EarlE. Lockwood (Aug. 8, 1972).
7 3 OrIo REv.-CoDE ANN. § 127.11.
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gate the claim and submit a report to the Board. After receiving the re-
port, the Board forwards a copy of it to the claimant 74 and schedules the
claim for a hearing. In claims under $1,000, unless the claimant re-
quests otherwise, the hearing is restricted to a private consideration based
on the forms alone, with no witnesses testifying and no additional evi-
dence taken. A full adversary hearing is held on claims over $1,000.
This seemingly simple procedure is fraught with limitations which re-
duce the ability of the claimant to receive an equitable disposition of his
claim.
There are no rules of pleading as such. The Board requires only that
the claim be submitted on a special form7" and that the statement of the
claim be specific enough for the Board to determine what the alleged
wrong is and which state agency is involved. All claims are returned to
the claimant by the Board until these minimal requirements are met.
The investigation of the claims causes several difficulties. Although
empowered to investigate all claims, the Board lacks the budget and staff
to investigate the approximately 500 claims filed annually. 0 Instead the
Board relies almost exclusively on the state agency involved. However,
there is no limit to the amount of time which an agency may take to in-
vestigate a claim. There is no default judgment procedure, no means of
forcing the departments to investigate the claims, 77 and indeed little in-
incentive for them to do so. 78  Since the Board rarely schedules a hear-
ing without the investigation report, an unconscionable delay may result.
.While most state departments cooperate with the Board, a few depart-
ments have a substantial backlog,70 and some claimants have waited as
long as four years for their claims to be investigated."0
74 This is a relatively recent innovation. Prior to 1972 the claimant had no knowledge
whatsoever of the state's position prior to the hearing.
75The Board requires that claim papers be in affidavit form and that five copies of
the claim and all supporting documents be filed. Forms are provided for claims for property
damage, personal injury, contract refund, unpaid bills, and miscellaneous damage claims.
There are no fees for filing a claim, and no costs are charged to claimants, even if unsuccessful.
7 Apparently the Board did at one time employ an investigator. See Walsh, The ONAo
Sundry Claims Board, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 441 (1948). It employs none now.
77 The President of the Board has the power to subpoena witnesses, books, and papers.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 127.11. Conceivably he could issue a subpoena duces tecum to
the head of the state agency involved, but this is highly unlikely.
78 See text accompanying notes 110 to 113 infra.
79 The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, for example, as of December 1973
had at least fifty claims pending against it, some dating back to 1970.
80 In 1972 there were fome claims filed as long before as 1968 which had not yet
been investigated. An extreme example of this unconscionable delay occurred in 1973 when
the Board after receiving an investigation report found that the claimant had been dead
for over a year and a half. Sundry Claim No. 14191, Nick J. Pantalco (dismissed Aug,
10, 1973).
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Even when an investigation report is promptly returned it is often
still inadequate. The claim forms and investigation report constitute an
archaic form of pleading which possesses the simplicity of pleading un-
der the civil rules, but not the sophistication. They often are totally in-
sufficient to adequately inform the Board of all relevant facts on small,
simple claims, much less on complex cases involving substantial sums of
money. Standing alone they frequently fail to isolate the issues in con-
troversy. This uncertainty is compounded by the lack of any discovery or
pre-hearing conferences. The lack of discovery puts the claimant at a dis-
advantage which the civil law rejected long ago. This is especially true
of complex contract claims in which the state may keep important infor-
mation from the claimant by simply not volunteering it.8' Because of
the lack of discovery, parties are often surprised at the direction and sub-
stance of the evidence at a hearing. Nonetheless, they are expected to
produce their entire case at the hearing. 'Y
The hearings themselves are short, informal, and "adversary" in na-
ture. Although the procedure contains "some of the trappings of judicial
proceedings,"8' 3 hearings seldom resemble a trial in a court of law. Each
party is given the opportunity to argue his case, to present witnesses"t
and to cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses. The Board does
not fully adhere to the rules of evidence. Hearsay evidence as well as any
other information tending to shed light on the claim is admitted. Al-
though there is no requirement that a claimant be represented by coun-
sel,"5 chances of recovery undoubtedly improve when the claimant has an
attorney to present his claim. This is especially true since the state de-
partment or other agency involved will normally be represented by an as-
sistant attorney general or special counsel.
If the claims were to proceed in a court of law, undoubtedly many
claimants, especially those having tort claims, would secure counsel on a
8 1 For example, Sundry Claim No. 15042, K. B. Guran Co. (July 20, 1973), depended
solely upon the interpretation of one clause in a highway construction contract between
the claimant and the Department of Highways. Had discovery been available the clmant's
attorney undoubtedly would have been able to produce evidence concerning the use and
interpretation of the clause in other highway contracts if such evidence existed. However,
the claimant was forced to present his case without such evidence and the department was
allowed to defend without ever producing evidence of how the clause had been interpreted
in other contracts. The claimant prevailed however, and the Board recommended an award
of $129,010.39.
82 Occasionally a claimant's attorney will mitigate the effects of lack of discovery by
requesting that the President issue a subpoena duces tecum to an important witness.
83 Statement of Joel S. Taylor at 4.
84 The parties have the right to petition the President to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments. OHio REv, CODE ANN. § 127.11.
8 5 Most claimants with claims over $1,000 are represented by counsel; most claimants
with claims for a lesser amount are not.
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contingent fee basis. However, it is illegal for any attorney to represent
a claimant before the Sundry Claims Board on this type of fee arrange-
ment.86 If a contingent fee is used, both the attorney and his client may
be subject to prosecution resulting in a fine, or imprisonment, or both,"
In theory it can be argued that this provision deprives certain poor claim-
ants of an opportunity to be represented by counsel, and thus decreases
the number and amount of damage awards made by the Board. 8
D. Applicable Legal Standards in Claims Before the Board
The Board has consistently held that the claimant must prove his
claim by a preponderence of the evidence, just as he would in a civil case.
While the statute does not specify what a claimant must prove to recover,
as a general rule the Board has required that claimants establish a valid
cause of action against the state. That is, a claimant must establish facts
which would permit him to recover damages against the state in a court
of law if there were no sovereign immunity. 8 Moral claims are not con-
sidered. 90 Although not expressly required to do so by the statute, the
86 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.76 provides:
No person, firm, corporation, or association shall be employed with respect to
any matter pending or that might legally come before the general assembly or
either house thereof, or before a committee of the general assembly or either house
thereof, for a compensation dependent in any matter upon the passage, defeat, or
amendment of any such matter, or upon any other contingency in connection there-
with.
The section is part of 'he anti-lobbying provision of the Ohio Revised Code. While
there may be substantial doubt as to whether the legislature intended the prohibition to
apply to hearings before the Sundry Claims Board, Board hearings are within the literal
ambit of the statute since any award in excess of $1,000 must be approved by the General
Assembly. Any doubt as to the section's applicability to sundry claims was removed by
two 1927 Ohio Attorney General opinions which interpreted the statute to cover attorneys
who represented claimants before the Sundry Claims Board on a contingent fee basis. 1927
Op. A'rr'Y GEN. 1665; 1927 Op. ArrY GEM. 2024.
S Under OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 101.78 and 101.79, both the attorney who vlolates
the section and his client are subject to prosecution which could result in fines of $200 to
$5,000 or imprisonment for one to two years, or both.
88 The argument rests on the premises that attorneys are aware of and follow the provi.
sion, a premise that is probably not factually correct.
89 See Sundry Claim No. 15050, Frank Johns (September 7, 1973) at 2.
90 However, the Board arguably does occasionally grant an award in which no definite
legal theory is apparent. See, e.g., Sundry Claims No. 14495, John W. Simon; No. 14591,
Ernest W. Teodosio; No. 14786, C. D. Lambrose; No. 14787, Delmar A. Christensen; No.
14496, Roger Maas; No. 14788, William L. Ziegler; and No. 14497, Matthew MeManus
(Oct. 13, 1972) which involved claims of attorneys (and some clients) representing Ohio
National Guardsmen involved in the 1970 shooting at Kent State University for fees and ex.
penses incurred in connection with investigations of the shootings and in connection with civil
actions against the guardsmen. "The Board felt that the guardsmen should not bear the bur.
den of attorney fees since it has not yet been shown that they acted other than within the scope
of their authority. The Board found that various officials, none with actual authority to bind
the State, represented to the guardsmen, if not the attorney claimants, that the state would pay
for employment of private counsel." H.B. No. 988, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.,
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Board has applied Ohio law to determine the extent of any legal duty.'1
With the exception of statutes of limitation 2 and the collateral benefits
rule,' Ohio substantive law controls all legal questions before the Board.
When there is substantial doubt whether a cause of action would exist
absent sovereign immunity, Ohio law is of limited use and the Board
sometimes refers to the law of those states which have fairly extensive
waivers of sovereign immunity. 4
In those areas where Ohio law is nonexistent or unclear the Board
must fashion its own rule of law and apply it to the facts before it. Be-
cause of the unique nature of the state's activities, several factual situa-
tions which seldom occur in private litigation frequently occur before
the Board. In order for a claimant to properly present his claim he must
have some means of ascertaining what legal standards will be used by
the Board and must be relatively sure that the Board will apply the same
rule of law to the same factual situation. In other words, there must be
written decisions which are available to the public and which have some
precedential effect. This is especially true because there is no controlling
body of appellate case law to which the claimant can refer for guidance.
Yet only since June 1972 have written decisions been rendered which
state the facts and legal conclusions of the claims decided. 5 Thus there
are relatively few written decisions. The few decisions which do exist
are kept in such a manner as to be practically uselessY6 And even when
§ 3, (1973). Although the State would have had no legal obligation to pay the awards
even if there were no sovereign immunity, the Board recommended awards from $250.00
to $24,797.50.
91The Board has applied Ohio law even where it thought the law was arbitrary and
unjust. See, e.g., Sundry Claim No. 15026, E. Gilson Mentzer (July 20, 1973).
92The Board generally follows the Ohio statutes of limitation, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2305.06 to .11 (Page Supp. 1972) and will deny a claim not timely filed. However,
the Board has not inflexibly applied these limits and has considered the merits of late
claims when the claimants have shown good cause for the failure to file timely. See Walsh,
supra note 76 at 442, and OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SERVICE
LErm No. I at2 (1966).
93 Although the collateral source rule which permits the plaintiff to recover from the
defendant the entire amount of his tort damages even though he has received some compen-
sation from collateral source is clearly established in Ohio, Pryor v. Weber, 25 Ohio St. 2d
104, 263 N.E.2d 235 (1970), the Board has consistently reduced a damage award by any
amount received from a collateral source.
94 The Board at times has relied upon the case law of New York, Washington, and
Illinois. See, e.g., Sundry Claim No. 15050, Frank Johns (Sept. 7, 1973) at 3-5.
95 Previously just the Board's conclusion was given with little or no explanation.
9GThe statements of fact and decision are public documents which are required by OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 127.11 to be kept on file at the Office of Budget and Management and
are open to inspection within the constraints of OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page
1969). However, there is do requirement that the decisions be indexed in any logical man-
net. Indeed the decisions are kept in chronological order with no subject index, no index
by names of defendant departments, no headnotes, and no syllabi. In such a state, the written
decisions are practically unusable and will become more so as their volume increases.
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
a decision on a previous claim is directly in point, there is always substan-
tial doubt whether the Board will follow it. This is especially true in
view of the non-legal nature of the Board's members and the fluidity of
the Board's composition."7
E. Payment of Claims
After hearing a claim the Board has the authority to approve or disap.
prove it."' The Board's action will definitely result in payment only of
those claims of $1,000 or less. 9 These small claims are paid from a spe-
cial fund.100 Claims over $1,000 must be approved by the legislature as
part of the annual sundry claims appropriations bill.' 0' The bill is pre-
pared by the president of the Board-and contains a very short statement
of each claim in which the Board recommended an award in excess of
$1,000. The bill goes through the normal legislative process. Hearings
are held in both houses and successful- claimants a'e often asked to testify,
especially on claims in which members of the finance committee may ques-
tion the Board's judgment. The committees often make changes in the
amounts of the awars, increasing some, decreasing or totally eliminating
others.102
97 From time to time the Board has referred to other claims as having some precedental
effect. E.g., Sundry Claim No. 15124, Rickie Lee Green (August 17, 1973); Sundry Claim
No. 15072, James Clark (September 7, 1973). It has even gone so far as to "overrule"
a previous decision. See Sundry Claim No. 15050, Frank Johns (September 7, 1973).
On the whole, however, the Board seems extremely reluctant to cite other claims,
98 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 127.11 provides in part that the Board "shall either approve,
approve with conditions and limitations, or disapprove each such claim."
99 Id. in pertinent part provides:
When any claim filed with it has been approved by the board in an amount of
one thousand dollars or less, the auditor of state, upon being presented with a
voucher for the payment thereof signed by the president and secretary of the board,
shall, if money has been appropriated for the payment thereof, issue his warrant
drawn on the treasurer of state in the amount set out in such voucher.
The above provision was added to the sundry claims statute in 1945, but the original limhiti.
tion was $200 rather than $1,000. 121 Ohio Laws 190 (1945). Prior to that amendment,
all claims had to be included in the sundry claims appropriations bill. In 1961 the size
of claims which could be paid by order of the board was increased to $1,000. 129 Ohio
Laws 451 (1961).
100 Id. in pertinent part provides:
In February of each odd-numbered year beginnin.g 1963, the director of the
office of budget and management shall estimate the cost of paying all the claims
in an amount of one thousand dollars or less to be allowed by the board during
the next succeeding biennium. He shall submit the estimate to the chairman of
the finance committee of each house to allow the general assembly to appropriate
funds for the payment of claims in an amount of one thousand dollars or less
which may be allowed by the board during the next succeeding biennium.
This provision was added to the sundry claims statute in 1961. #129 Ohio Laws 451 (1961).
101 Prior to 1967 a sundry claims appropriations bill was passed by the legislature only
biennially; since 1967 such bills have been passed annually.
102 See 135 OHIo H. Jouao - (June 19, 1973) and note 104 infra
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Sundry claims appropriations bills are far more likely to be delayed or
defeated than ordinary appropriations bills because the Ohio constitution
requires that they be approved by two-thirds of those elected to each house
rather than the normal majority of a quorum.103  Interestingly, however,
amendments to a sundry claims appropriation bill, like amendments to
other bills, require only a majority to pass. The difference between the
votes required to amend the bill and those required to pass it creates
unique problems for sundry claims bills. For example, if a majority com-
prising more than one-half the members present, but less than two-thirds
of the total membership, is in favor of deleting a claim the amendment
will pass, but the bill will fail as long as the minority insists on retaining
the deleted claim. Similarly, if a minority of over one-third disfavors a
claim, it will be unable to effect an amendment, but it can defeat the bill.
This can and has resulted in a situation where several hundred thousand
dollars in deserving claims are delayed or denied due to political bicker-
ing over a few claims."'
103 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 29 in pertinent part provides:
[Nor shall any money be paid, on any claim, the subject matter of which
shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law, unless such compensation, or
claim, be allowed by two thirds of the members elected to each branch of the gen-
eral assembly.
104The 1973 Sundry Claims bill is an excellent example. It encountered almost all
the vicissitudes which it is possible for such a bill to encounter in the legislature. As
originally introduced in the House, the bill, H.B. No. 988, 110th Gen. Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (1973), contained nine contract claims, eight personal injury claims, fifteen property
damage claims, one refund claim, one reimbursement claim, three claims for payment for
rervices, two claims for unpaid bills, and ten miscellaneous claims, all claims totalling
$555,160.00. On June 19, 1973, the House amended the bill, adding over six thousand
dollars each to two personal injury awards, adding over $81,000 to a widow's claim for
the wrongful death of her husband, deleting two property damage claims against the Division
of Highways, adding four property damage claims (which had apparently been approved
by the Sundry Claims Board too late to be included in the bill when it was introduced),
and deleting the claims of five attorneys for fees for representing Ohio National Guardsmen
in hearings stemming from the Kent State shootings. 139 OHIO H. JouR. - (June 19,
1973). Further amendments were made on the House foor on July 2, 1973. The claims
of the National Guardsmen's attorneys and one property damage claim were put back into
the bill, and the claims of three ex-state senators for pay for two years of senate membership
they lost in 1967 and 1968 when their terms were cut short by reapportionment were
deleted. 135 OHIo H. JoUR. - (July 2, 1973). As amended, the bill passed the House
by the required two-thirds vo:e that same day.
On July 10, 1973 the bill as passed by the House was introduced in the Senate and
assigned to the finance committee. The finance committee reported the bill out with recom-
mended amendments on July 18, and the Senate passed those amendmenis at that time.
135 OHIo S. JOUR. - (July 18, 1973). The amendments included: the addition of
one personal injury claim and one property damage claim, the replacement in the bill of
the claims of the three ex-senators which had been deleted by the House, reduction of
the wrongful death claim of the widow from the amount approved by the House to the
original amount approved by the Sundry Claims Board, addition of a clause limiting the
attorney's fees on the widow's claim to twenty per cent of the award, and deletion of the
claim of an attorney for payment for services for representation of the state as special counsel
in the prosecution of Lima State Hospital employees for alleged brutality to patients. The
1974]
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Even if claims have been approved by the Board and both houses of
the General Assembly, they still run the risk that the governor will veto
the appropriation bill entirely or use his item veto'05 to excise specific
claims from the bill.100 Vetoes of sundry claims appropriations are espe-
cially difficult to override since they require a two-thirds vote or each
house, rather than the normal three-fifths vote.
The entire process of securing legislative approval of claims over
$1,000 causes unconscionable delay in the payment of claims. If there is
any disagreement over the bill's provisions, it may take as long as a year
for the bill to pass both houses and be signed by the governor. In addi.
tion to this delay there may be a ninety-day delay between the passage of
last amendment was apparently motivated by politics: the Senate is controlled by Republicans,
and the attorney was a heavy contributor to Democratic Governor John J. Gilligan's 1970
campaign and was a Democratic nominee for Congress. Columbus Citizen Journal, August
30, 1973, at 1, col. 3. The Senate passed the amended bill on July 24 after an attempt
to remove the additions failed. 135 O4io S. Jour. - (July 24, 1973).
The House refused to accept the Senate amendments to the bill, 135 Ohio H. Jour.
- (July 26, 1973), and it was referred to. a Senate-House Conference Committee on
July 26. The Conference Committee recommended that the Senate's version of the bill
be accepted with two changes. The Senate's twenty percent limitation on attorney's fees
for the widow's wrongful death claim was to be deleted and in its place a note was to
be inserted that the award was "subject to the provisions of Sec. 101.76 of the Revised
Code, as applicable." The claims of the three ex-senators were to be deleted again. The
House accepted the report and passed the bill in the report's version on August 28, 135
Ohio H. Jour. - (August 28, 1973). However, the Senate vote in favor of the compro-
mise was 18 for and 13 against, and the compromise was defeated for lack of the required
two-thirds majority. 135 OHIO S. JOUR. - (August 28, 1973).
The bill was sent to a new Senate-House Conference Committee which recommended the
Senate version with the daims of the three ex-senators being reduced from $16,000 to $10,000,
The House vote on the report was 60 in favor and 30 opposed. Since the votes of two.thirds
of the entire membership ((6) was necessary for passage, the report failed by six votes.
135 Omo H. JOUR. - (February 20, 1974). A rhotion for reconsideration was left
pending. 135 OHIO H. JOUR. - (February 21, 1974). A, month later the report was
reconsidered and defeated by 5 votes. 135 OHIo H. JoUR. - (March 20, 1974).
A third conference committee was then named and that committee recommended the
deletion of the three ex-senators' claims. At the last session before a month-long adjournment
the Senate agreed to the report by the minimum twenty-two votes required. 135 Onto
S. JoUi. - (April 3, 1973). The House agreed to the report by a vote of 87 to
1. 135 OHIo H. JOUR. - (April 3, 1974). The governor signed the bill April 1974,
and because of the emergency clause it became law on that date nearly two years after its
introduction.
105 OHIO CONST. art. 11, § 16 in pertinent part provides: 'The governor may disapprove
any item or items in any bill making an appropriation of money and the item or items,
so disapproved, shall be void .. "
100 The item veto has been used in the past, for example, on August 20, 1969, Governor
James Rhodes used his izem veto on the claim of the Armel Construction Company for
$61,860.55 (Sundry Claim No. 13321) and on the claim of the John R. Jurgenson Company
for $4,800.00 (Sundry Claim No. 13646). Am. H.B. No. 830, 108th Ohio General Assem.
bly, Reg. Sess. (1969). 133 Ohio Laws (Appropriations Acts Supp.) 207 (1969). He
stated in his veto message that, on the basis of a report submitted to him by the Department
of Highways, he concluded that, contrary to what the Board had found, the state did not
cause the damage. Veto Message of Gov. Rhodes, 133 OHIO H. JOUR. 1561-62 (September
11, 1969).
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a bill and the date it takes effect."' 7  Even after the bill goes into effect,
it takes four to six weeks for the state to process the paperwork before
the claimant actually receives his money.'"" Faced with up to two years
delay before they receive their damages, claimants often limit or reduce
their claim to $1,000 in order to guarantee prompt payment.109
F. Adversary Parties and Accountability
A basic principle upon which the Anglo-American system of juris-
prudence relies in order to achieve just results is the principle of adversary
advocacy. In theory a just result can best be reached by relying on the
opposing parties to present and argue the facts and the law before a neu-
tral court and jury. While Sundry Claims Board hearings are often de-
scribed as "adversary" proceedings, they are so in theory only. Unlike
private defendants the particular state department or agency responsible
for the alleged harm is in no way held accountable for its action. Claims
are paid out of the general revenue fund or some special fund 10 and not
out of a particular agency's budget. Neither a negligent employee nor
a negligent department is directly affected by a claim"' and thus neither
has any financial incentive to change his behavior.'"2
10 7 The ninety-day delay can be and frequently is avoided by adding an emergency provi.
sion which provides that the law will go into effect immediately upon the governor's signa-
ture.
108 An example of this delay is Sundry Claim No. 13837, Edward E. Jennings (July
28, 1970). In that claim the Board found that the state was responsible for the crushing
of four of the claimant's fingers which resulted in their amputation. The Board recom.
mended only an award of $6,500 even though the President noted in his separate opinion
that a jury might reasonably have awarded $12-15,000 for the same injuries. Because Mr.
Jennings' claim was part of a bill which included some controversial claims, Mr. Jennings
went nearly two years without being paid the compensation which no one has said should
not be paid him.
109 See, e.g., Sundry Claim No. 14033, Ronald E. Waddell (Aug. 8, 1972), where the
Board reduced a recommended award of $2,400 to an award of $1,000.
11 0 For example, certain claims against the Department of Transportation's Division of
Highways have been paid from the Highway Fund, certain claims against the Liquor Control
Board from the Liquor Control Rotary Fund, and certain claims against the Department
of Natural Resources from the Wildlife Fund. See, e.g., 133 Ohio Laws (Appropriation
Acts Supp.) 7,31 (1969).
III Certain departments are indirectly accountable if the claims are paid from a special
fund from which the department draws revenues. The only major example is the Depart-
ment of Transportation, Division of Highways. Claims against the Division of Highways
are paid from the Highway Fund from which the legislature appropriates money to the
Division for its work. This small element of accountability, coupled with the large sums
involved in cases of large highway construction contracts, has led to the most adversary
of the proceedings before the Board in which the facts and issues are more clearly brought
into focus and the legal issues explained and briefed more thoroughly than in other cases.
Such adversariness, however, is the rule in courts of law, rather than the exception.
112 Although it- is sometimes asserted that the Board members, in their capacities aprt
from Board membership, can exert through the budgetary and auditing processes some control
over how well an agency performs and can give the head of the department involved an
1974]
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Because of this lack of financial accountability, the defendant state de-
partment or agency may not be a true adversary. Often a particular
agency will have no desire to investigate the facts of the claim, brief
the legal issues, or argue the state's legal position. Sometimes a depart.
ment will go so far as to recommend payment of a claim for non-legal
reasons such as public relations or moral considerations. Because of this
lack of a truly adversary procedure, the Board is sometimes forced either
to guess what the facts and applicable law are or to investigate the matter
itself; and the Board's staff is inadequate to fully do the latter. 8  Con-
sequently, the Board often makes legal decisions without adequate facts
or legal arguments.
This lack of accountability and adversary advocacy is complicated by
the fact that there is no means by which a claimant can compromise or
settle a claim without formal Board action, even if the state department
were for some reason willing to do so. A hearing is required in all
cases since only the Board can determine the amount of the award and
either authorize its payment (if $1,000 or less), or recommend that the
legislature appropriate money to pay it (if greater than $1,000). Only
if the department admits complete liability for the full amount of dam-
ages can a full hearing be avoided. In those cases, if the Board is con-
vinced of the legal and factual validity of the claim, an abbreviated hear-
ing is held. However, the cases in which full liability is conceded are
rare, undoubtedly because the state can neither completely avoid a hear-
ing nor save money by admitting liability. Thus many matters which
could be compromised and settled out of court in ordinary civil proceed.
ings go to a full hearing before the Sundry Claims Board.
G. Appeals from Decisions of the Board
The informal nature of the Board and the absence of procedural
guidelines often seem to invite what would be reversible error in a court
of law. However, there is no formal appeal from the decisions of the
Board, either as a matter of right or as a matter of discretion. "The
Board's decision, however arbitrary, however erroneously founded in its
incentive to correct a dangerous practice, Sundry Claim No. 15124, Rickie Lee Green (Au.
gust, 17, 1973) at 3, this budgetary accountability is more theoretical than real, possibly
because, in the process of planning the large budget of a state agency, the agency's needs
for funding for its services overwhelms any will of financial officers to use the money as
leverage to correct practices producing claims, or possibly because the budgeting officials
never consider the problem at appropriations time.
11 The Board's staff consists of a secretary and a part-time clerk. While the clerk
has sometimes been asked to investigate the law and facts on a particular matter, these
tasks would undoubtedly be performed much better by an advocate who is paid for represent-
ing his client's interests.
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legal interpretations, and however based upon faulty fact-finding, is the
final word if a claim is dismissed, unless a rehearing can be wangled."114
While the unsuccessful claimant has no recourse,115 successful claim-
ants run the risk that the legislature will not agree with the Board's find-
ings. The state sometimes views the committee hearings as a forum for
appeal of claims which it has lost before the Board. Claimants, espe-
dally those for whom the Board has approved large awards, run the risk
of having their claim deleted from the bill by the legislature. This risk
is heightened when only one party, the state, testifies before the legisla-
tive committee about a particular claim, and thus is a substantial pitfall
to unsuspecting or uncounseled defendants.
III. THE PROPOSED COURT OF CLAIMS ACT,
SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL No. 800
The sundry claims system has long been recognized as unfair and in-
adequate, and there have been frequent calls for statutes granting a broad
consent to suits against the state (consent statutes).' 6 From 1917 to
114 Statement of Joel S. Taylor at 3. A claimant may request a rehearing on any grounds.
The Board considers all such requests, but usually grants them only if there is new evidence.
Occasionally a daimant who has failed initially will prevail at the rehearing. For example,
in Sundry Claim No. 11865, William Hinegardner (Aug. 22, 1972), the Board recommended
an award of $5,300 although the claim originally was denied after the first hearing in
November 1965. This claim demonstrates the lack of adequate procedural rules and the
resulting injustice which can occur. At the November 1965 hearing the claimant offered
evidence to prove that the stae had been negligent After the hearing the state sent evidence
of contributory negligence to the Board. Based on this evidence of contributory negligence,
to which the claimant had no opportunity to respond, the Board denied the claim in January
1966. At thesecond hearing, in 1972, the claimant was able to respond to the State's de-
fense and did so successfully.
115Although the constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances is, of course,
always available to the rejected claimant, the legislature appears to have adopted a policy
of appropriating funds to pay only claims previously approved by the Sundry Claims Board.
This policy is in accord with the main reason for the enactment of the sundry claims statute
-the removal of the basic decision as to the validity of claims from the legislature and
placing it into the hands of a body less subject to political pressure. See the criticisms
of the method of remedying claims by private statutes voiced at the 1850 and 1912 constitu.
tional conventions. 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONsTrruTiONAL CONVENTION
OF 1850 297 (1850); 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITuTIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1431 (1912). But this Policy has apparently not been
followed consistently by the legislature during the whole period of the existence of the
Sundry Claims Board, for in 1935 Gov. Martin Davey used his item veto on 54 items
in the sundry claims appropriations bill for that year, asserting that some of the items
"have been rejected or . . . have not been examined by the Sundry Claims Board." 116
Ohio Laws (Appropriations Acts Supp.) 413 (1935).
11See 9 OHIO ST. LJ. 491 (1948), and Comment, Claims Against the State of Ohio:
The Need for Reform, 36 U. CIN. L REv. 239 (1967), which contain specific proposals, and
1 OHIO STATE BAR ASSN, 2 ADminIsTRATrvE LAW SERVICE Lm= No. 1 (1966), and
Comment, Ohio Sovereign Immunity; Long Lives the King, 28 OHIO ST. LJ. 75 (1967)
for proposals of a more general nature. ._
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1974 there were several attempts to enact a broad consent statute,11 7 but
all ended in failure." 8  Now, in the 110th General Assembly, the House
of Representatives has passed and sent to the Senate a broad proposal to
establish the state's first Court of Claims, Substitute House Bill No. 800.111
This part of the note will explain and analyze the provisions of this bill.
117 Although no comprehensive consent statute has ever been enacted the state has con-
sented to be sued in a number of limited areas. Statutes authorize the attachment, garnish-
ment, and execution against the wages of state employees, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 115.46(Page 1969); the foreclosure of certain pre-existing liens, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.24(Page 1970); suit to recover on water conservation bonds, OHIO REv. COD ANN. § 1523.10(Page 1964); and suit to recover certain fees paid to the secretary of state under protest,
OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 111.19 (Page 1969). In addition the state has given the right
to "sue and be sued" to several state authorities. However, this right has been narrowly
construed. See text accompanying notes 9-11 rupra.
118Between 1917 and 1953 the legislature rejected such bills at least eight times,
Amended Substitute House Bill No. 82, defeated by tied floor vote, April 9, 1919, Bulletin
of the 83rd General Assembly 132 (1919); House Bill No. 511, died in committee, 1923,
Bulletin of the 85th General Assembly 220 (1923); Senate Bill No. 110, died in committee,
1935, Bulletin of the 91st General Assembly 41 (1935); Senate Bill No. 171, died in
committee, 1937, Bulletin of the 92nd General Assembly 64 (1937); House Bill No. 123,
died in committee, 1939, Bulletin of the 93rd General Assembly 193 (1939); House Bill
No. 299, died in committee, 1945, Bulletin of the 96th General Assembly 276 (1945);
Amended House Bill No. 217, reported out of committee, but never vo:ed upon, 1949,
Bulletin of the 98th General Assembly 276 (1949); Substituted House Bill No. 285, reported
out of committee, bur never voted upon, 1951, Bulletin of the 99th General Assembly
266 (1951).
On July 7, 1953, a broad conent statute was passed by the General Assembly. The
bill, Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 73, provided for consent to sue the state in contract
and tort. Bulletin of the 100th General Assembly 27 (1953). It was vetoed by Governor
Lausche on July 24, 1953. The governor stated that he thought the Sundry Claims Board
worked well and saw no reason to abandon it. See 125 OHIO S. JOUR. 1159 (July 24, 1933).
The legislature sustained his veto.
Between 1953 and 1971 only one of six proposed consent statutes received serious consid.
eration. Amended House Bill No. 121, defeated in the House by a vote of 52-60, May
9, 1955, Bulletin of the 101st General Assembly 196 (1955); House Bill No. 925, Indef-
initely pos-poned July 23, 1960, Bulletin of the 103rd General Assembly 370 (1960); Senate
Bill No. 402, indefinitely postponed July 10, 1961, Bulletin of the 104th General Assem.
bly 104 (1961); Senate Bill No. 109, indefinitely postponed July 11, 1963, Bulletin of
the 105th General Assembly 40 (1963); House Bill No. 109, indefinitely postponed March
17, 1963, Bulletin of the 106th General Assembly 223 (1965); House Bill No. 326, indef.
initely postponed September 8, 1967, Bulletin of the 107th General Assembly 295 (1967).
In 1971, two consent statutes, House Bill Nos. 225 and 226 were proposed. House
Bill No. 226 was indefinitely postponed but a substitute bill was favorably reported out
for House Bill No. 225. Bulletin of the 109th General Assembly 269 (1971). The substi-
tute bill contained provisions consenting to suit in tort and contract and establishing a
Court of Claims to entertain such suits. The bill received a favorable vote of 59-21 in
the House and was sent to the Senate. It was favorably reported out by the judiciary
committee and was sent to the rules committee for scheduling a floor vote. While the bill was
in the rules committee the sponsors of the measure discovered that the Ohio constitution stated
that the legislature could create new courts, but only "whenever two-thirds of the members
elected to each house shall concur therein," OHIO CONSr. art. IV, § 15. Since the bill
had fallen seven votes short of the required 66 House votes, the bill was never scheduled
for a vote in the Senate.
119 House Bill No. 800 was one of two proposed consent statutes patterned on die
previous Substitute House Bill No. 225. The House judiciary committee recommended its
passage with amendments on July 2, 1973, and it passed the House by a vote of 81-14
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A. Consent Provisions
Unlike earlier Ohio bills which proposed to waive the stAte's immu-
nity only for tort and contract claims, the Proposed Court of Claims Act
provides a broad, unlimited waiver. It simply states:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to
be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created
in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to
suits between private parties, subject to the limitations set forth in this
chapter.120
The waiver provision is composed of two main elements: (1) a listing of
the political entities which are included within the waiver, and (2) a
statement of the degree to which the immunity of those entities has
been waived.12'
The state alone, and not the political subdivisions of the state, are in-
cluded within the waiver provision. Unlike the sundry claims statute, the
bill clearly and narrowly defines what claims are against the "state."
(A) "State" means the state of Ohio, including, without limitation, its
departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies, institutions, and other
instrumentalities. It does not include political subdivisions.122
on July 11, 1973. The Senate judiciary committee recommended several amendments and
reported out a substitute bill on March 5, 1974. All references to the bill are to the bill in
the form in which it was sent to the Senate rules committee. If passed the bill will go into
effect January 1, 1975.
120Sub. H. B. 800, § 1, proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.02(A), 110th General
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973). Hereinafter all references to § 1 of the bill, which contains
all the permanent law changes, will be cited only to the proposed new code sections.
121 The various state consent statutes can be classified by the degree to which they waive
the stare's immunity, however the term "state" may be defined. The simplest and most
complete consent statutes are those which contain an unlimited, total or "blanket" waiver
of state immunity. Both New York and Washington have "blanket" waivers, New York
on all civil actions without exception, N.Y. CT. OF CLAims Act § 8 (McKinney 1963),
and Washington on all torts without exception, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1972).
A second class of consent statutes are those with "open-ended" waivers. See Lansing, The
King Can Do Wrong! The Oregon Tort Claims Act, 47 ORE. L REV. 357, 359 (1968).
The "open-ended" approach involves a total removal of all sovereign immunity which is
then qualified by a series of exceptions. The Federal Tort Claims Act takes this approach,
carving out a number of broad excep-ions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680 (1970). The Oregon
statute is also an "open-ended" consent statute, but one with more limited exceptions. OME
REv. STAT. § 30270 (1971). The third class of consent statutes are "dosed.ended," that
is, the sature first affirms total immunity and then creates special exceptions to it. The
prime example of a "dosed-ended" waiver is the California provision. CAL. GOVT. CODE,
§ 815 (West 1966). Although the various approaches may be prompted by the same motives
and intended to achieve the same results there may be important practical differences in
the manner in which the statutes are interpreted. For example, a court is more likely
to construe strictly a "closed-ended" consent statute than one which contains an "open-ended"
or "blanket" waiver of immunity.
122 Proposed OMO REV. CODE § 2743.01. It should be noted that the definition of
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Further uncertainty is avoided by the definition of "political subdivisions."
(B) "Political subdivisions" means municipal corporations, townships,
villages, counties, school districts, and all other bodies corporate and pol-
itic responsibile for governmental activities in geographic areas smaller
than that of the state to which the sovereign immunity of the state at-
taches.123
The exclusion of political subdivision from the waiver of immunity
provision contrasts sharply with the consent statutes enacted in other
states, which have generally chosen the theoretically consistent position
of abrogating sovereign immunity on all level,;. 12 4  Although the same
general policy arguments that have been made against continuing the
sovereign immunity of the state can be made with respect to its political
subdivisions, the exemption of political subdivisions from the provisions
of the bill seems to be a sound practical judgment. Political subdivisions
are local in nature and draw their funds primarily from local sources
-not from the state. While the decision to give consent to suit on a
state level was fully supported by the state Department of Finance,1
many local political entities which are notably hard pressed for revenue
may have been opposed to waiving their immunity. And, obviously, op-
position to the bill by these entities would greatly diminish its chances
for passage. Moreover, successful implementation of the bill's provisions
without a substantial drain on the state's finances might remove many
doubts about the desirability of extending the bill's provisions to include
political subdivisions, and thus might well pave the way to more exten-
sive legislation in the future.
Whatever the advisability of continuing the immunity of local politi-
cal entities, the legislature's intent to distinguish between the state and its
political subdivisions seems clear. The consent statutes enacted in New
York and Washington totally waive those states' immunity, but do not
define the term "state." Consequently, courts in both states have inter-
preted the statutes to cover claims against local political entities as well
as claims against the state itself.120  Since political subdivisions of the
"state" is in terms of the state's departments, agencies, etc., its corporate-type bodies, not
its individual employees or agents. Thus, under the proposed Court of Claims Act the
state would be liable for its employees' negligence in the same manner as any other corporate
body, that is, there would have to be some theory (e.g., respondeat superior) upon which
the negligence of the agents could be imputed to the state. Without facts supporting such
a theory the state could not be liable.
1251d.
124 See, e.g., ALAs. STAT. § 09.65.070 (1973); CAL. GoVT. CODE § 815 (West 1966);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.031 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265 (1971); UTAH CODu AN,.
§§ 63-30-2 to 63-30-10 (1968).
125 See Statement of Joel S. Taylor at 1.
126 Holmes v. Erie County, 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243, all'd 291 N.Y. 789,
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state of Ohio derive what immunity they do possess from the state, the
specific exclusion of political subdivisions from the definition of "state"
in the bill is necessary to avoid a total abrogation of the immunity doc-
trine at all levels.
Even though the effect of the bill is limited, in that only the state is in-
cluded within the waiver of immunity, the state's waiver of immunity
would be total. No function or activity of the state is expressly exempted
from possible liability. This unlimited waiver stands in marked contrast
to the provisions of such statutes as the Federal Tort Claims ActO- and
the California Tort Claims Actr '8 which have a number of substantial lim-
itations on liability.
Unlike most other consent statutes the bill contains no express excep-
tion from liability for a state officer's or employee's performance or failure
to perform a discretionary function or duty.'2  In this respect the bill
closely resembles the statutes enacted in Washington and New York
which also contain no mention of this discretionary function immunity.
However, the absence of any provision for such immunity does not mean
that if the bill is enacted the state would be liable for all harm resulting
from the acts of its employees. The courts of New York and Washing-
ton have been uniform in holding that immunity for discretionary func-
tions exists apart from the sovereign immunity waived by statute.130 Since
a contrary holding could lead to undesirable results, possibly even to a
serious obstruction of governmental operations,"' there is no reason to
believe that a similar result would not be reached in Ohio.
Thus some fo rm of discretionary function immunity would undoubt-
edly exist in Ohio despite the absence of any provision for it in the bill.
By not defining the immunity itself, the legislature is leaving to the courts
the problem of deciding the exact parameters of such an immunity. This
is not wholly undesirable since any detailed legislative direction could
probably not produce effective results in every situation. Allowing the
courts to fashion a rule by reference to the facts before them and decisions
53 N.E.2d 368 (1943); Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.-.2d 604
(1945); Kelso v. Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964).
12728 U.S.C. 2680 (1970).
128 CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 814-895.8 (West 1966).
129 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970); ALAS. STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1973); CAL
GovT. CODE § 815 (West 1966); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.032.(2) (1971); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 30.265(2)(d) (1971).
130 Gross v. State, 33 App. Div. 2d 868, 306 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1969); Rottkamp v. Young,
21 App. Div. 2d 373; 249 N.Y.S.2d 330 afl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 831, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944,205
N.E.2d 866 (1964); United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246,407 P.2d 440 (1965).
131 See, 36 WAs-L L REV. 312, 324 (1961).
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in other jurisdictions should be more equitable, albeit, at least initially,
more uncertain.
Since only the state's immunity is waived by the bill, any other form
of common law immunity possessed by state officers or employees would
continue to exist. Besides discretionary function immunity, which is
usually considered an executive immunity, judicial immunity probably
would not be waived by the bill. This immunity is broader than discre-
tionary function immunity, since it reaches judicial acts whether discre-
tionary or ministerial. 2  The courts of both Washington' 8 and New
York'1 4 have recognized the continued viability of this immunity in the
face of total waivers of sovereign immunity. Even if a judge acted in
such a manner that he would not be individually immune from liability, " '
in order to establish a valid cause of action against the state, a claimant
would have to develop some theory upon which the judge's liability
could be imputed to the state. 30 Even if a judge could be considered
a state officer or employee,1 37 the theory of respondeat superior would
have no application since judges are not subject to the direction and con-
trol of state authorities.138  A judge would not, therefore, be an agent
of the state for the purpose of imputing liability to the state. Thus the
total waiver in the proposed Court of Claims Act would do nothing to
change the present lack of effective legal redress for a party injured by
the wrongful acts of a judge acting within the scope of his jurisdiction. 180
Perhaps the major problem concerning the extent of the state's liabil-
132 See Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohio St. 186, (1878); Childs v. Voris, 4 Ohio N.P.
67, 6 Ohio Dec. 75 (C.P. Summit Cry. 1897); Voll v. Steele, 141 Ohio St. 293, 47 N.E.2d
991 (1943).
133 Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
134 Farrell v. State, 204 Misc. 148, 123 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
135 This would be true if, for example, the judge acted wholly without jurisdiction or au.
thority. See Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 451 (1918); Maxey v.
Gather, 94 Ohio App. 115, 51 Ohio Ops. 310, 114 I.E.2d 607 (Summit Cry. 1952),
13 6 See note 122, supra. See also, Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d
606 (1966) Where the claimant conceded that the individual responsible for the harm was
immune, but argued that the state should be liable anyhow. The court rejected this argu-
ment.
137 There is considerable doubt whether a judge elected from a geographical area less
than the whole state, exercising jurisdiction in only a part of the state, and paid only In
part or not at all from state funds could ever be a state officer or employee within the
meaning of the Act.
138The New York courts have often baesed their findings of no state liability for judicial
acts on this lack of control and inapplicability of the theory of respondent superior. See
Farrell v. State, note 134 supra; Jamieson v. State, 7 App. Div. 2d 944, 182 N.Y.S.2d 41
(1959).
130The Sundry Claims Board has repeatedly held that the state cannot be liable for
damages based upon judicial errors. See, e.g., the well reasoned opinions in Sundry Claim
No. 15050, Frank Johns (September 7, 1973), and Sundry Claims No. 15152, William
Kammerer (September 7, 1973).
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ity is caused by the language of the waiver itself. According to the
bill, the state consents only "to have its liability determined ... in accor-
dance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private par-
ties ..."140 Since there are a number of functions which are intrinsically
capable of performance only by the government and not by private par-
ties,"' the state may be immune from liability resulting from damages
caused by these "uniquely governmental functions" despite the "blanket"
waiver of immunity.
The exact meaning of the language providing for use of the same
rules of law "applicable to suits between private parties" is far from clear.
It could mean no more than that the same general tort and contract law
principles which are applicable to private parties will be applied to the
state to determine the extent of its duty in any particular situation. How-
ever, the "rules of law applicable to private parties" might be interpreted
to mean only those rules which evolved specifically in the context of pri-
vate party litigation, and which have no application to activities beyond
the competence of private parties. The chief problem with the first in-
terpretation is that at some point the analogy between actions of private
parties and actions of the state breaks down. The chief problem with
the second interpretation is that in its broader forms it limits the liability
of the state more severely than may have been contemplated by the draft-
ers.
Some possible guidance may be gained from the New York statute.
It states that New York "consents to have [its liability] determined in
accordance with the same rules of law as applied in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations .... ,,142 The New York courts have
interpreted this phrase to make certain "uniquely governmental functions"
immune from possible liability, but the exact extent of this immunity is
still unclear.143  It is clear that the traditional distinction between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions has no application to the determina-
140 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.02 (A). This same restriction specifically applies
to appeals. "Appeals from .. . the court of claims lie to the same courts under the same
circumstances, as appeals from the court of common pleas of Franklin county, and the semc
rules of law govern their determination." Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.20 (emphasis
added).
14 1 See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE Lj. 229, 240 (1925).
142 N.Y. Ct. of Claims Act § 8 (McKinney 1963).
143 See, Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Functions,
10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 30 (1958) (Hereinafter cited as Herzog]. A similar distinction has
been drawn under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15 (1952); Indiana Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See also Note,
Federal Government Liability "As a Private Person" under the Tort Climxs Act, 33 Im.
UJ. 339 (1958); Henke, Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability Law From a National Perspec-
tive, 48 ORE. L REv. 45, 104-105 (1968) (Hereinafter cited as Henkel.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tion of what activites are uniquely those of the state government.144 Leg,
islative decisions, 145 judicial acts, 146 quasi-judicial acts of administrative
agencies, 147 and certain acts to preserve the public peace and safety148
have all been held to create no possible liability because they are uniquely
governmental. However the New York decisions are of limited value
since they are neither uniform nor theoretically consistent.
It is submitted that the proper interpretation of the phrase should be
one that does not frustrate the ostensible policy for which the bill was
proposed, that is, to compensate parties injured by the state in a just,
effective manner. Thus certain uniquely governmental functions should
be exempt from liability, but the number of these activities should be
limited by keeping three factors in view: (1) Most of the activities tradi-
tionally described as uniquely governmental can quite properly be placed
in the discretionary function and judicial act immunities which will not
be altered by the proposed Court of Claims Act;149 (2) the question
whether any other function should be exempt from liability should focus
not on who performs the function, but rather on whether or not the state
has a legal duty to perform the function;"" (3) even though there are
valid reasons for exempting from liability damage caused by purely gov-
ernmental functions requiring some legislative, judicial, or administrative
decision making, "there is no valid reason to extend the immunity to
claims based upon negligent or wrongful conduct in the execution of
such decisions." 151
B. Court of Claims Provisions
1. Generally
Despite waiving immunity from suit and from liability generally, the
bill would not permit the state to be sued in common pleas courts. In-
stead it would create a special Court of Claims. 52
The court of claims would be a court of record sitting in Franklin
County and having exclusive jurisdiction of all actions removed thereto,
144 Id. at 31.
145 Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917).
146 Farrell v. State, 204 Misc. 148, 123 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Ct, Cl. 1953); Fishbein v. State,
204 Misc. 151, 120 N.Y.S.2d 92 (C. Cl. 1953).
147 See, e.g., Chikofsky v. State, 203 Misc. 646, 117 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
148 See Herzog at 38-41.
149 This is especially true if decisions by th& legislature ate included in the discretionary
function immunity exception.
150 See Henke at 103-110.
151 Id. at 104.
152 Proposed OHIo REv. COD1E § 2743.03 (A).
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as well as exclusive original jurisdiction of all actions permitted by the
consent provisions of the bill. It also would specifically be given full
equity powers and power to entertain counterclaims, cross claims, and
third party daims.' 53 The court would be staffed by incumbent or re-
tired judges of the supreme court, courts of appeals, or courts of common
pleas, temporarily assigned to the court by the Chief Justice of the supreme
court. Ordinarily a single judge would hear and determine a claim
against the state, but the bill would also empower the Chief Justice of
the Ohio supreme court, upon application by either party, to appoint a
panel of three judges to hear any claim involving novel or complex issues
of law or fact. In such cases concurrence of two judges would be re-
quired to decide the claim. 54
The court of claims would operate similarly to the Court of Common
Pleas of Franklin County. It would have the same power to subpoena
witnesses, require the production of evidence, and punish for contempt
as any court of common pleas. 55 Appeals from the court would be
handled in the same manner as appeals from the Court of Common Pleas
of Franklin County.256
The establishment of a special court would eliminate one of the chief
weaknesses of the present sundry claims procedure. The fate of a claim
would no longer rest in the hands of officials of the executive or legisla-
tive branches of state government who have other full time non-legal
duties, but instead would be entrusted to independent and legally trained
judges, who would be experienced in handling litigation between private
parties.
Establishing a court of claims is far more appealing than using the
existing court system for several reasons. It would prevent this whole
new class of civil suits from being added to the already overloaded dock-
ets of existing courts. As a result, speedier trials should be possible. More
importantly, to the extent that the judges of a special court would become
more familiar with certain unique types of actions by handling them fre-
quently, they should develop a certain expertise, resulting in a higher
quality of jurisprudence. Claims such as those arising out of compli-
cated multi-million dollar highway construction contracts, which usually
incorporate hundreds of pages of standard and specialized specifications,
would be more likely to be tried properly by judges who have experi-
ence with them than by judges who rarely if ever see such suits. More-
13The court also has jurisdiction over claims involving certain lake lands pursuant
to Amended OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5313.04-05.
154 Proposed OHIo REv. CODE § 2743.03 (A)-(C).
155 Proposed OIo REV. CODE § 2743.05.
156 Proposed OHIO REv. CODE § 2843.20. See note 2 .rupra.
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over, a specialized court with appeals to a single court of appeals would
permit a uniformity of judgment which could not be matched if existing
trial courts were used.
The method of staffing the court should offer many advantages if
properly implemented. Empowering the Chief Justice to choose the court
of claims judges from the ranks of incumbent judges elected by the people
combines the ,best features of the appointive and elective systems, and
at the same time avoids the drawbacks of a state wide election for these
highly sensitive positions. The Chief Justice would be given the power
to appoint judges eligible for ?ctive duty pursuant to article IV, § 6(c)
of the Ohio constitution. 57 Thus the Chief Justice would be allowed to
continue to capitalize on the resources of able, but retired judges.
This provision should result in the selection of some of Ohio's most
competent judges. It should also result in the maximum use of Ohio
judicial resources by enabling the Chief Justice to select a competent re-
tired judge or an incumbent judge whose caseload is not as great as
those in heavily populated areas. The bill allows th judge to be selected
to hear even a single claim, thus enabling the Chief Justice to capitalize
on the special talents or expertise of a particular judge for a particular
claim. If a claim involves an especially complex area, the Chief Justice
might pick a judge with expertise in that area, instead of having to settle
for the judge who has the fewest cases on his docket.
While the court would have statewide jurisdiction, as the bill is pres-
ently written the court would sit almost exclusively in Franklin County.
The Chief Justice could direct it to sit in other counties, but only on re-
moval claims, and even then only upon a showing of substantial hard-
157 OMo CONsT. art. IV, § 6() was part of the modern courts amendments and reads
in part:
No person shall be elected or appointed to any judicial office if on or before
the day when he shall'assume the office and enter upon the discharge of its duties
he shall have attained the age of seventy years. Any voluntarily retired judge, or
any judge who is retired under this section, may be assigned with his consent, by
the chief justice or acting chief justice of the supreme court to active duty as a
judge...
There are at least four classes of inactive Ohio judges that can be legally denominated
as "retired," two of them voluntarily retired, and two of them involuntarily retired. The
term "voluntarily retired judges" can be applied to those judges who voluntarily cease per.
forming judicial functions either by choosing not to seek election to another term or by
not completing the term to which they were elected or appointed. The term can also
be applied to those judges who are no longer eligible for election or appointment because
they are in excess of seventy years of age. The term "involuntarily retired judges" can
be applied to those judges who were compulsorily retired due to a physical or mental disabil.
ity, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2701.11-12 (Page Supp. 1970), and to judges who were
defeated in their efforts to be re-elected for another term. The constitutional amendment
and therefore the bill, is carefully drafted to exclude judges who were compulsorily retired
or defeated at a judical elecion. See Milligan & Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amend-
tuentsto the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 811, 837-838 (1968).
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ship or when justice dictates. "8 In many areas the drafters of the pro-
posed Ohio Court of Claims Act seemed influenced by the New York
Court of Claims Act,15 9 but in this area they neglected to learn from an
important provision of the New York statute. The New York court has
the ability to provide for regular or special sessions of the court for such
terms and in such a manner as it may deem advisable.' ° The judges of
the court have minimized the cost and inconvenience to claimants and
witnesses by establishing a flexible schedule of two terms a year in eight
cities other than the capital.'' Such extensive "circuit riding" would not
be needed in Ohio since the Ohio proposal does not include local politi-
cal entities within its waiver provisions. But in view of the extensive na-
ture of state government services even in rural Ohio counties, a provision
permitting some flexibility as to where the court would hear cases would
seem advisable. A provision providing the Chief Justice of the Ohio su-
preme court with the authority to provide for terms in such places outside
Franklin County as he would deem advisable would decrease the burden
on claimants residing beyond central Ohio, without necessarily eliminat-
ing the advantage of centralized administration, filing, and appeals.
Among the most significant features of the proposed Court of Claims
Act are the restrictions relating to the trier of fact. A delegate to the
Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912 expressed the fear that the state
could not afford to be sued since juries would think that "The state has a
lot of money and we will make the state pay."10 '-' This fear appears also
to have motivated the authors of the bill, which would allow claims to
be tried only to a judge. The bill explicitly states that "no claimant in
the court of claims shall be entitled to have his claim against the state
determined by a trial by jury."'61 3 Although the Ohio Constitution pro-
vides that the "right of trial by jury shall be inviolati,"I6 the provision
for only non-jury trials on claims against the state would undoubtedly
be constitutional since the constitution has been interpreted to provide a
right to a trial by jury only where the right existed at common law prior
to the adoption of the Ohio constitution.'6 5
Apparently, the bill's denial of the right to a jury trial is based upon
538Proposed OMIO REV. CODE § 2743.03(B).
159 N.Y. CT. OF CLAIMS Act (McKinney 1963).
160Id. § 9(10).
161 N.Y. CT. OF CLAIMS RULES §§ 1200.1, 1200.2.
1622 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUnTONAL CONVEbTON OF THU
STATE OF Omo 1919 (1912).
163 Proposed OHo REv. CODE § 2743.11.
16 4 Omo CONST. art , § 5.
165Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner, 121 Ohio St. 393, 169 N.E. 301 (1939).
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the commonly held belief that juries would find the state liable more of-
ten and assess higher damages than would judges. Examples of sensa-
tional million-dollar personal injury awards are often cited to show a
tendency on the part of juries to give excessive damages. However, the
question whether or not juries are generally biased in favor of plaintiffs
was investigated during the University of Chicago Jury Project, and statis-
tics compiled during the project reveal that judges and juries agreed on
liability in seventy-eight percent of all civil cases.,, Of the twenty-two
percent of the cases in which judge and jury disagreed, the jury favored
the plaintiff in twelve percent of the cases while the judge favored the
plaintiff in the other ten percent of the cases. Judges thus found for
the plaintiffs fifty-four percent of the time, while juries found in the
plaintiff's favor only slightly more often, fifty-six percent of the time.1",
While these findings would tend to discredit the popular belief that
the jury is much more likely to find for the plaintiff than the judge as a
general rule, in assessing the applicability of these findings to suits against
the state it must be noted that the state is not an ordinary defendant. In-
deed, the study revealed that when the defendant was a city or state the
jury found liability eight percent more often than did the judge."0 8 Al-
though in an ordinary civil case the judge and jury were in substantial
agreement on the question of the defendant's liability, they differed sharp-
ly on the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled. Jury
awards were about twenty percent higher than those by judges. 19 This
difference increased to twenty-five percent when the defendant was a
corporation, a city, or a state. 170 Thus the fear of the bill's framers that
giving the right to trial by jury of claims against the state would cost
the state more money than denying it, appears to be well-founded.
There may, however, be serious nonmonetary costs to eliminating
jury trials. The judge may not be capable of fully performing some of
the traditional jury functions in the same manner as a jury. Judges, like
juries, must base their findings of fact upon their view of the proceedings.
This view will always be colored by the viewer's background, experiences,
prejudices and limitations. When eight persons are charged with this
fact-finding duty, their personal characteristics may tend to cancel each
other out resulting in a more unbiased fact-finding. While an experi-
IGGH. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEL, THE AMEImcAN JURY 63 (1966). [Hereinafter cited
as KALVEN AND ZEISEL].
167 Id, at 64.
16SBroeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L REV. 744, 750 (1958).
[Hereinafter cited as Broeder].
169 KALVEN AND ZEISEL at 64 n.13.
1 7
o Broeder at 750.
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enced judge is usually considered an asset to the trial process, this may not
always be true. Precisely because of their experience, judges may have a
subconscious predetermination about a type of case, a general fact situa-
tion, or even the attorneys. A jury which hears only a few cases is less
likely to have such predilections."" "In weighing disputed testimony,
a variety of minds developed by an array of human experience is the
greatest assurance against error."' 12
Perhaps the chief cost of eliminating jury trials is the loss of the jury's
unique ability to bridge the gap between "law in the books, and law in
action,"'s73 its power to harmonize law and reality. There are situations
in which the application of general rules of law will produce a result
totally inconsistent with considerations of justice and equity. The denial
of all relief in cases where the plaintiff is only slightly negligent while the
defendant is extremely negligent is often cited as an example. The judge
cannot act as a harmonizer because he is bound to write an opinion mak-
ing specific findings of fact and discussing all the issues in view of the
applicable law. In contrast, the jury's findings may be secret and only
articulated in a general conclusionary form.7 4 The jury's examination
in secret of a harsh rule of law is more likely to bring that rule into ac-
cordance with community standards of justice than are the deliberations
of a judge. While it may be argued that the legislature alone should
make "corrections" in the law, "practice can not always wait upon the
proper development of legal theories .... Legislatures and courts are of-
ten laggards in the process of [harmonizing law and reality].""'
While all these factors may have been considered and rejected by the
drafters of the bill, 76 it is more probable that the provision making judges
the sole triers of law and fact is an essential compromise between those
who wanted to provide a legal remedy for wrongs committed by the
state and those who feared such a remedy would cost too much. With-
out such a compromise the bill's chances for passage would be greatly
decreased. Whatever may be the relative merits of trying a claim before
'7' Hogan, Thoughts on Juries in Civil Cases, 50 A.B.A.J. 752, 753 (1964).
172Summers, Some Merits of Jury Trials, 39 TULANE L REV. 3, 11 (1964). (Herdn-
after cited as Summers).
173 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L REV. 12, 18-20 (1910).
174 See Summers at 9-10.
175j. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 38.02[1], at 17 (2d ed. 1971).
176 Here also the drafters may have been influenced by the New York statute. Although
most states which permit suits against themselves have allowed these suits to be tried to a jury,
the New York statute explicitly denies the right to trial by jury in all claims against the
stare. N.Y. CT. OF CLAIMS Acr § 12(3) (McKinney 1963). The fact that the provision
has apparently worked well in New York, see McNamara, The Court of Claims: Its Develop-
ment and Present Role in the Unified Court System, 40 ST. JoHN'S L REv. 1, 48 (1965),
may have increased its influence.
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a judge rather than before both a judge and jury, either alternative is
more attractive than "trying" a claim before an administrative tribunal of
five state officials.
2. Jitirisdiction"
As previously mentioned, the court of claims would have "exclusive,
original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the
waiver of immunity contained in [the bill]."1' Due to the restrictive
definition of the word "state," it is clear that an action against any politi-
cal subdivision of the state could not be brought in the court of claims.
Unlike some earlier bills attempting to create a court of claims, 178 the pro.
posed Court of Claims Act does not limit the jurisdiction of the court to
specified tort or contract claims in which the claimant alleges damages in
excess of a certain minimum or under a certain maximum. The bill pro-
poses to abolish the Sundry Claims Board as of 1975,"0 to give the court
of claims exclusive jurisdiction over those claims against the state author-
ized by the bill. However, the section of the bill containing the waiver
of immunity specifically states that: "To the extent that the state has pre-
viously consented to be sued, the chapter has no applicability. '"180 While
this limitation on the chapter's applicability is easier to draft into legisla-
tion than a systematic review of all the instances in which the state has
previously consented to suit, the state would be better served if the legis-
lature would conduct such a review and make a determination of which
suits should be maintained in a common p!eas court and which should be
maintained in the court of claims. It makes little sense to require plain-
tiffs to sue the secretary of state in the common pleas court to recover
fees,18' while requiring them to sue the same department in the court of
claims for the negligence of one of its employees.
The bill also provides for a mandatory removal from any state court
of actions in which a party files a counterclaim against the state or makes
the state a third-party defendant.182  The party filing the counterclaim or
impleading the state would be required to file a petition for removal in
the court of claims, stating the facts entitling him to removal, together
177 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE, § 2743.03.
178E.g., Am. Sub. H. B. 225, 109th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1972), restricted the
proposed court's jurisdiction to contract claims in excess of $1,000 and tort claims between
$1,000 and $100,000.
179 Sub. N. B. 800 § 2, 110th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973).
180 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.02(A).
181 See note 117 rupra.
182 Proposed OHIo REv. CODE § 2743.03(E)(1). The proposed removal provisions seem
patterned upon the federal removal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1970). Thus federal
precedents may be of some value in resolving any difficult issue which may arise.
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with copies of all process, pleadings, and other papers served on him in
the action.las If the court should find that the removal petition does not
justify the removal or that the state is no longer a party it may remand a
claim to the original court. Upon removal the court of claims would
have the complete power to adjudicate all the claims in the case,'" but
the parties would retain their right to a jury trial of any claims not against
the state. 8 5 All judicial orders issued prior to removal would remain in
effect and all bonds or other security would remain valid.186
The bill would also eliminate the double litigation problems inherent
in the sundry claims procedure, since it specifically provides that the court
"may entertain and determine all counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-
party claims.""'8 While this provision would cause some inconvenience
to third parties impleaded by the state, these specific inconveniences would
be far outweighed by the need to settle all related claims in one forum
at one time.
3. Procedural and Substantive Rules
a. Procedural rules
As noted earlier, one of the primary deficiencies of the sundry claims
procedure is the absence of explicit procedural rules. No such void would
exist with the court of claims.818 Except insofar as the bill would specif-
ically establish special inconsistent procedures, the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would govern all practice and procedure in the court of claims. The
bill notes that the supreme court may promulgate rules governing practice
and procedure in actions against the state in the court of claims as pro-
18 3 The petition for removal must be filed within twenty-eight days of the servie of
the complaint if based on a counterclaim and within fourteen days of service of the third-
party complaint if based on third-party practice or within the time allowed for the original
answer as extended by the original court. Within seven days of the filing of the removal
petition, the petitioner would have to give written notice of the filing to all parties and
file a copy of the petition with the clerk of court in which the action was originally com-
menced. This filing with the clerk of the original court would effect the removal of the
action to the court of claims, and the clerk of the original court would forward all papers
in the case to the court of claims. Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.03(E) (1)-(2).
184 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.03(E)(2).
185Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.11. Claims involving jury trials are heard in
the chambers of the common pleas court of Franklin County or the county where a removed
claim is heard. Jurors are selected and empaneled in the same manner as other cases in
that court of common pleas. The State pays all expenses incident to a jury trial except
juror costs which are taxed to the losing party.
186 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.03(E) (3).
187 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.03 (A).
188 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.03(D).
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vided by the Ohio constitution.18 In'addition the bill specifically pro-
vides that:
(A) The complaint or other pleading asserted in the court of
claims against the state shall name as defendant! each state department,
board, office, commission, agency, institution or other instrumentality
whose actions are alleged as the basis of the complaint.
(B) Upon the filing of the complaint or other pleading requiring
services of summons, the clerk of the court of claims shall issue sum-
mons to each defendant and the attorney general. Summonses shall be
in the form prescribed ny and issued pursuant to the Civil Rules. The
claimant shall file with the clerk one copy of the complaint or other
pleading for each named defendant, plus four additional copies.190
Thus the bill would make it very clear that the defendant (at least the
nominal defendant) in any action is not the state as a whole, but the in.
dividual department, board, or agency involved.
The use of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure would be a marked
change from the present sundry claims procedure. Claimants would be
able to use such devices as a simplified form of pleading,1 ' broad discov-
ery rules,19 2 and pretrial conferences.' 93  The proper use of these devices
would clarify the issues involved, facilitate the gathering of evidence, and
largely prevent surprise defenses by the state, thus eliminating three prac-
tical problems inherent in the sundry claims procedure. Another key prac-
tical advantage of the rules is that the default judgment rule1 04 would
preclude a state agency from refusing to investigate a claim for long pe-
riods of time. While the provision can hardly guarantee that there would
be no backlog of claims, as a practical matter the possibility that a claim-
189 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5. The possible conflict between this section, a part of
the modern courts amendment passed in 1968, and OHIO CoNs'r. art. 1, § 16, should be
noted. Article I, § 16 provides in part that "suits may be brought against the state, in
such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law." Article IV, § 5(B) states
in part: 'The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
The plaintiff in the Krause case argued that by not disapproving of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which in part provide for service of process on the state, the General Assembly
gave its consent to suit. The court rejected the argument on the basis that the right to
consent to suit was a substantive right which could not constitutionally be modified by
any rules promulgated the Ohio Supreme Court. The court did not discuts the simpler
argument that the more recent amendment, art, IV, § 5(B), modified the earlier provision,
art. I, § 16, in such a way that the supreme court rather than the legislature could provide
the courts and the manner in which suits could be brougiht against the state. In view
of the court's interpretation of art. I, § 16, this argument would undoubtedly have been
resolved against Krause.
190 Proposed OHIo Rnv. CODE § 2743.13.
19 1 OmIo R. Civ. P. 8.
192 Id. 26.
19a Id. 16.
194 Id. 55.
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ant would have to wait three years before the state investigates his claim
will be miniscule.
It should be noted that the normal default judgment procedure might
not be strictly applicable to the state. Rule 55(D) of the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure states: "No judgment by default shall be entered against
this-state, a political subdivision, or officer in his representative capacity
or agency of either unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to
relief by evidence satisfactory to the court."'0 5 The provision is patterned
upon rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, '"° but because
there are several differences between Ohio rule 55 and the Federal rule 55,
federal precedents may be of questionable value." 7 The staff notes indi-
cate that the Ohio rule was intended for the state's protection and "re-
quires that satisfactory proof, as in Rule 55 (A), be taken before a de-
fault judgment may be entered."' 8s
Rule 55(A), which Mso deals with default judgments, states in part
that:
If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into ef-
fect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of
damages or *to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to
make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such
hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper and
shall when applicable accord a right of trial by jury to the parties.91'
When read literally the rule appears to leave the determination of the
need for a hearing to the judge's discretion, at least when the sum re-
quested is liquidated. However, the staff notes seem to indicate that a
hearing is' necessary in all cases.200 According to these notes, at the hear-
ing the "necessary proof" required before a default judgment may be en-
tered is "quite similar to the proof of claim requirement of § 2323.11,
R.C.""' Under that section the plaintiff was not automatically entitled to
relief if he claimed. an unliquidated sum. He could be required to prove
that he had a good cause of action and the amount of his damages.F-
Thus the special requirement of rule 55(D) that the court be satisfied by
195Id. 55(D).
196FED. RK Cv. P. 55(e) states that 'No judgment by default shall be entered against
the United States or an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court."
19 7 See staff notes for OHIO R. Civ. P. 55.
.98 Id. (emphasis supplied).
19 9 Omo R. CIv. P. 55(A).
2 00 See staff notes for OHIO R CIV. P. 55(A).
201 d. -
2 0 2 Streeton v. Roehm, 83 Ohio App. 148, 38 Ohio Op. 240, 81 NY..2d 133 (1948);
see also Note, Default Judgments in Ohio, 12 W. REs. L REv. 747 (1961).
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the evidence of the plaintiff's claim should seemingly be interpreted to
require no more than that a hearing be held at which the plaintiff must
show both that he is entitled to relief and the extent of his damages. If
interpreted in this manner the distinction between rule 55(A) and rule
55(D) would not be a burden on the claimant and, in view of the slight
possibility that the state would default in any action, would be of little
practical significance, other than to force the state department, board,
office, commission, agency, institution, or other instrumentality 23 to in-
vestigate the claim promptly.
The potential conflict between rule 55(D) and rule 37(B) (2) (c)
might be of more practical significance. The latter rule provides that if a
party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery the court may,
among other things, render "a judgment by default against the disobedi-
ent party.' 20 4 Whether this power would be qualified by rule 55(D) is
an open question, but presumably since the procedure under rule 55(D)
is the same as tloat which might be required under rule 55(A) for private
defendants, the. rule does not give the state special rights which would al-
low it to escapk a just sanction for failure to allow discovery. If rule
55(D) were interpreted to give the state a special exemption from the
rule 37(B) (2) (c) sanction of default, the claimant would be put into
the untenable position of having to prove his case without being allowed
to use the traditional discovery tools with which to do it. Thus the de-
fault judgment sanction under rule 37 should be applied even when the
state is the defendant.
While the procedural provisions of the bill would correct many of the
problems inherent in processing claims before the Sundry Claims Board,
all the advantages of an informal, administrative procedure designed for
claimants who are not represented by counsel and who claim only small
amounts are retained. The bill provides that "Upon written consent of
the claimant, claims against the state for amounts greater than one hun-
dred dollars and less than one thousand dollars may be heard and deter-
mined administratively by the clerk of the court of claims,"205 who would
be required to be licensed to practice law in Ohio.2 10  Claims of less than
one hundred dollars would automatically be determined administratively
by the clerk. These small claims would be filed on special forms pre-
203 Hereinafter the term "department" alone will be used to signify the instrumentality
whose actions form the basis of the complaint. The term should be understood to encompass
all state departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies, institutions or other instrumen-
talities.
2 04 OHIo R. CIv. P. 37(B)(2)(c).
205 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.10(A).
206 Proposed OHIO REv. CODE § 2743.07(A).
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scribed by the supreme court, and copies would be forwarded to the at-
torney general and to the state department involved. The latter would
then investigate the claim and send a report to the clerk within sixty
days of receipt of the copy of the claim. The clerk then would have to
forward a copy of the investigation report to the claimant, who would
then be given a chance to respond either in writing or by appearing be-
fore the clerk,20 7 presumably in an informal administrative hearing. - 8
The clerk would be given the authority to establish procedures for such
claims, but these procedures would have to be informal and designed for
laymen rather than lawyers. Although the clerk's decision would have
to be based on the same principles of law applied in the court of daims,
strict rules of evidence would not be applicable in any administrative de-
termination. The clerk would make a final decision, fully noting his
findings of fact and conclusions of law.2° Upon motion of either party
the court of claims would have to review the clerk's decision upon the
basis of his report and the papers filed in the claim and enter a judgment
in accordance with its findings. This judgment could not be appealed and
no further civil action arising out of the same facts or transaction could
be commenced in the court of claims.2 10
While the identical goal of having an informal administrative proce-
dure for small claims could be accomplished by the retention of the pres-
ent Sundry Claims Board for such claims, the legislature specifically re-
jected this approach..2 11 The institution of a new administrative proce-
dure would have several advantages over the retention of the Sundry
Claims Board. As opposed to the present procedure, the state would be
required to investigate all claims within sixty days, which should result
in quicker final determinations. Moreover, the final determination
would be made by someone skilled in Ohio law and would be based on
Ohio law, which should eliminate any doubt as to the applicable legal
standards and the competence of those who apply them; and if either
party doubts that the decision is based on a correct interpretation of the
law he would be allowed a review in a court of law as of right.
b. Statutes of limitation
The proposed Court of Claims Act contains a special statute of limita-
207 Proposed OHno REV. CODE § 2743.10(B).
208 The bill does not specify that an informal hearing would have to be held in any
case, but reading the section as a whole and in view of current Sundry Claims Board pratice,
it appears that an informal hearing is intended whenever the claimant so desires.
209 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.10(C).
210 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.10(D).
211 Am. Sub. H. B. 225, 109th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1972) would have retained
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tions applicable to all actions in the court of claims. As a general rule,
all claims against the state permitted by the bill would have to be com-
menced within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. However,
in cases of injury to property or personal injury caused by tortious con.
duct, either the claim itself or a written notice of intention to institute
such a claim would have to be filed in the court of claims within 180 days
of the accrual of the cause of action. In cases of claims for damages for
wrongful death caused by tortious conduct, either the claim or a written
notice of intention to file a claim would have to be filed in the court of
claims within 180 days after the appointment of the executor or admin-
istrator of the decedent's estate. Even if written notice of intention to
file a claim is filed, claims would have to be commenced within two years
of the time of the accrual of the cause of action. The applicable period
of limitations would be tolled under normal statutory conditions, 2 2 ex-
cept that there would be no tolling during imprisonment unless the im-
prisoned person were of unsound mind. 13
The required contents of the written notice of intention are specifically
delineated..2 14  Failure to include all required information in the notice
would be grounds for dismissal. However, the court would have discre-
tion to permit a claimant who failed to file a notice on time to file his
action within two years of accrual of the cause of action if good cause
were shown or if the claimant could show that the state or its agents had
knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim prior to the ex-
piration of the 180-day period.215
Normally, statutes of limitation are enacted to assure an end to litiga-
tion and to establish a state of stability and repo;e.2 1' They are based on
the premise that "stale" claims cannot be justly resolved and should not
be permitted. If actions copld be commenced at any time after the action-
able conduct occurred the court may be incapable of reaching a just result
because key evidence may have been destroyed or lost, memories may
have become distorted, and witnesses may have moved away or died. In
the legislature's discretion, various statutes of limitation ranging from
the Sundry Claims Board for such claims, as would have 1. B. 983, 110th General As-
sembly, Reg. Sess. (1973).
212 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (Page Supp. 1972) provides that the statute of
limitations shall be "tolled whenever the person entitled to bring the action is within the
age of minority, of unsound mind, or imprisoned.
"
13 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.16(A).
214 Proposed OHIO REv. CODE § 2743.16(c).
2 15 Proposed OHio REv. CODE § 2743.16(D).
2 110 See LaBarbera v. Batsch. 10 Ohio St. 2d 106, 114, 227 N.E. 2d 55, 62 (1967); Wyler
v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 171, 267 N.E.2d 419, 423 (1971); Callahan, Staluici of
Limitations-Background, 16 OHIo ST. LJ. 130 (1955).
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twenty-one years- 17 to one year*-8 have been set for actions between pri-
vate parties in Ohio.
The special statute of limitations in the bill would actually result in
longer time limitations in a few cases, -19 but when the bill's provisions as
a whole are compared with the statutes of limitation applicable to actions
between private parties, the provisions seem arbitrarily and illogically
short.220  If a person is injured in an automobile accident caused by the
negligent driving of a private individual, the injured party normally has
two years in which to commence his action."21  If the same person is in-
jured in the same manner by a state employee acting within the scope of
his employment, the injured party would have only six months in which
to file either his action or his written intention to file an action against the
state. Also, while it is possible that the state may have a higher turnover
in personnel than private businesses and may not retain written records or
documents of evidentiary value as long as private businesses do, these fac-
tors hardly justify a thirteen-year difference in the length of the statute of
limitations on written contracts between private parties and the state. -
The harsh effects of the six-month time limit may be mitigated some-
what by the provision granting the court the discretion to allow a claim-
ant who failed to meet the 180-day deadline to file his claim within two
years of its accrual if good cause can be shown, or if it can be shown that
the state knew the essential facts of the claim before the expiration of
the 180-day period. However, it is easy to imagine claims in which at
least one of the essential facts would be unknown to the state before the
217 OMO REV. CODE AN. § 2305.04 (Page 1954) provides that actions to recover tide
to or possession of real property must be brought within 21 years after the cause of action
accrues.
2 1 8 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Page 1954) provides that actions for libel, slan-
der, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, malpractice, or upon a statute
for a penalty or forfeiture must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.
219 See actions mentioned supra note 218.
22 0 The bills provisions are arbitrarily short in comparison with the statutes of limitations
applicable to actions between private parties in Ohio, but not in comparison with statutes
of limitations applicable to claims against the stare in states other than Ohio. There is
a definite trend to limit the time in which an action may be brought against a state. See,
e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 4.92.100 (Supp. 1973) (same statutes of limitations but the state
must receive notice of the claim within 120 days), ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.275 (1971)
(two-year statute of limitations with a requirement that notice be given to the state within
180 days) N. Y. CT. oF CLAIMs Acr § 10 (McKinney 1963) (two-year general statute
of limitations with a requirement that notice must be given to the state within 90 or
180 days depending on the type of claim); CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 911.2, 945.6 (West
1966) (claim must be presented to government within 100 days or one year depending on
the type of claim; if rejected by the government, suit must generally be commenced within
six months of rejection).
221 OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1954).
2220mo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (Page Supp. 1972).
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action was filed. The bill leaves the meaning of "good cause" and "es-
sential facts" entirely to the court. Moreover, even if good cause, or total
state knowledge of the essential facts, or both, were shown, the judge
would still have discretion not to allow the claim. In view of the reluc-
tance of appellate courts to find an abuse of trial judges' discretion, a
deserving claimant could well be left without a remedy.22 8
The shorter time limits in the bill seem to be based solely on the fact
that the state is the defendant, and thus seem to be more a reflection of a
desire to reduce the total amount of damages for which the state might be
liable rather than to prevent any "stale" claims which could not be justly
resolved. It is also possible that this indirect means of limiting the dam-
ages the state could have to pay was intended to forestall some objec-
tions to the bill and to ensure its passage. However, equitable considera-
tions would seem to require that statutes of limitation apply uniformly
to all defendants.224
c. Limitations on the amount of recovery
Unlike Amended Substitute House Bill No. 225, which was considered
by the 109th General Assembly, the proposed Court of Claims Act con-
tains no direct or jurisdictional limit on the amount of damages which
the court may award. During debate on the bill on the House floor there
was an attempt to limit the maximum award to $100,000, but the attempt
failed.22 5 However, damages would be subject to reduction by another pro-
vision. The bill states that, "Awards against the state shall be reduced by
the aggregate of insurance proceeds, disability award, or other collateral
recovery by the claimant.112
Even though tort damages are generally compensatory in nature, Ohio
has long been an adherent of the collateral source rule, permitting an in-
jured plaintiff to receive full recovery from the tortfeasor despite the fact
that the plaintiff may have been compensated in whole or in part from
other sources.227  While the rule has come under increasing criticism, 2 8
23 See, e.g., Lee v. Jenning Transfer Co., 14 Ohio App.2d 221, 223, 237 N.IL2d 918,
920 (1967): "To constitute an abuse of discretion, an unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscio.
nable attitude on the part of the trial court must be shown by the patty asserting a claimed
abuse of discretion."
224 Indeed such equity may be required by the equal protection clause. See Turner
v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973); Reich v. State Highway Dep't., 386 MIch.
617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
225The vote on the amendment was 26-69. 135 OHIO H. JOUR.- (July 11, 1973).
220 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.02(B).
227 Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio Si. 2d 104,263 N.E.2d 235 (1970).
228 See Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages. The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV.
L REV. 741 (1964).
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and the Sundry Claims Board has abandoned it,2-  Ohio courts have con-
tinued to make the tortfeasor pay for the injured party's wages which were
never lost and expenses which were never paid. The rejection of the rule
in the bill could be based on sound tort policy as well as on a legislative
desire to prevent windfalls to the claimant at state expense, and should
cause little injustice to injured parties."3
As a general rule, the proposed system would, allow interest on any
judgment, to be paid in the same manner and at the same rate as in litiga-
tion between private parties. 31 The only exceptions would be that (1)
no interest would be allowed beyond sixty days after receipt of the judg-
ment for payment by the Auditor, and (2) no interest would be allowed
for the time between 180 days after the accrual of the cause of action
and the filing of the complaint in the action. The court would also have
the discretionary power to deny interest for any period of undue delay
for which the claimant is responsible between the filing of the complaint
and the rendition of the judgment.2- - The interest provision, especially
when coupled with the special statute of limitations, would provide a dis-
incentive for delay in prosecuting a claim, but it would not adversely
affect the diligent claimant if the state pays the judgment within sixty
days. Using the power to withhold interest for unwarranted delay is a
unique idea and could help keep the court's docket relatively current.
Although cutting off interest after sixty days after the Auditor receives
a certification of the judgment may seem arbitrary, it would be of little
practical consequence. Payments are normally processed within sixty
days now and any unwarranted delay could be checked by use of a writ of
mandamus.
4. Payment of Judgments against the State
Claimants not using the optional administrative procedure would pro-
ceed to trial as they would in any other civil action. An assistant attor-
ney general or special counsel appointed by the attorney general would
defend the state.2 The issues would be tried before the court, and if
judgment were rendered against the state, the court would have to specify
which state department was liable. 234 After all appeals were determined,
2 2 9 See note 93 supra.
230 California has judicially abrogated the rule in claims against the state based on the
premise that it is punitive, and under the California consent statute the government can.
not be liable for punitive damages. See Salinas v. Souza & McCue Constr. Co., 66 Cal. 2d
217, 424 P.2d 921, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1967).
231 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.18(A).
232 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.18(B).
233 Proposed OHiO REV. CODE § 2743.14.
234 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.19(A).
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and all rights to appeal exhausted,235 the clerk would forward a certified
copy of the judgment to the state auditor and to the Office of Budget and
Management. The latter would then have to check the financial accounts
of the particular defendant to see if sufficient unencumbered moneys
would be available in the biennial appropriations made to the department
by the legislature. If the Office determined that sufficient funds were
available, it would certify that fact to the Auditor. Upon this certifica-
tion, the Auditor would draw a warrant to the Treasurer of State for the
judgment and applicable interest, and would charge the amount to the
available unencumbered funds of the defendant state department. If the
Office of Budget and Management determined that there were not suf-
ficient available unencumbered funds in the defendant's budget, then it
would have to request that the judgment be paid out of the emergency
purposes fund or any appropriations for emergencies or contingencies. If
there were sufficient moneys in this fund, they would have to be used to
pay the claimant.3 0  If there were not sufficient unencumbered moneys
in the emergency purposes fund, the defendant department would have
to request that the General Assembly make an appropriation to the de-
fendant department to pay the judgment. The request would have to be
made in the current biennium and in each succeeding biennium until a
sufficient appropriation were made..2"  An award based upon an admin-
istrative determination by the clerk would be paid in the same manner.238
The payment provisions outlined in the bill would be exclusive and
no execution could issue against the state. -89  The various stages in the
payment process would be controlled completely by state officials. While
the claimant could enforce the payment provision by writ of mandamus,24
he would take no direct part in the process.
While a provision mandating that judgments be paid from a special
claims fund would be much simpler, the more complex approach of the
proposed Court of Claims Act would have a distinct advantage in that it
attempts to secure a measure of departmental responsibility for its actions.
Unlike the sundry claims procedure in which claims based upon a par-
ticular department's misconduct are satisfied by special appropriations of
235 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.19(D). The subsection also states that if only
part of a judgment is appealed, and the portion of the judgment not appealed provides
for payment of a claim, that portion of the judgment may be processed.
236 Sufficient moneys would exist in such funds when there would be "moneys greater than
the sum total of then pending emergency purposes fund requests or requests for releases
from the other appropriations." Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.19(C)(5).
237 Proposed Oro REV. CODE § 2743.19 (C) (6).
238 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.10(E).
230 Proposed OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.19(B).
240 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2 743.19(C).
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-the legislature, the bill would require that, whenever possible, the judg-
ment must be paid from the department's current budget. The bill would
make the position of a state department roughly analogous to that of a
private corporate defendant. The more negligent a particular department
would be, the more that department would have to "tighten its belt" to
find the funds to pay the judgments rendered against it. The attempt to
inject financial accountability into the process should theoretically reduce
the number of torts, breaches of contract, and other injurious acts, com-
mitted by any particular department. However, if carried to an extreme,
it could also reduce the amount of beneficial public services which that
department could perform. A few large judgments could cripple a de-
partment operating on a tight budget. Because most departments would
have unencumbered funds-4' in their budgets throughout most of the
biennium, this crippling effect could hit at any time.
However, the bill contains a provision which would prevent this ex-
treme result. A judgment could only be paid from a department's budget
if the Office of Budget and Management certified the "availability of un-
encumbered funds" to the auditor. However, the Office of Budget and
Management would have the "sole discretion to determine whether or not
unencumbered moneys ... are available for satisfaction."'": While the
exact meaning of this phrase is less than clear, the section presumably
would give the Office the authority to say that the unemcumbered funds
are not available because they have been budgeted for other purposes
which are more important to the state. If the phrase were interpreted in
this manner, the Director of the Office of Budget and Management,
working in conjunction with the executive of the department involved,
would have wide discretion concerning when to tax a department's budget
with payment of the judgment. Thus the bill would strike a balance be-
tween the need for departmental responsibility for legal wrongs and the
need for uninterrupted state services. -2 4
3
2
-
41-Neither the Ohio Revised Code, nor the proposed Court of Claims Act, nor the
biennial budget define the term "unencumbered funds." The Office of Budget and Manage-
ment has understood the term "encumbered funds" to mean funds which the state is under i
current obligation to pay. Thus funds allocated for debts for such things as contracted
services or materials, incurred but not yet paid, would be encumbered because the state has a
presently existing obligation to disburse them. Funds forfuture programs, services, materials,
etc., although budgeted would be unencumbered.
242 Proposed OHIo REV. CODE § 2743.19(C) (4).
2 43 A similar balance was struck in the state of Washington. There the Director of
the Office of Program Planning and Fiscal Management must authorize the payment of
all claims against the state from a special tort judgment fund appropriated by the legislature.
The director then must order the state agency responsible for the tort to reimburse the
claims fund from funds which the legislature has appropriated to that agency for its use.
In any case where reimbursement would seriously disrupt the operation of a state agency
the director may waive the agency's obligation to reimburse the claims fund. The director
19741 NOTES
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If the Office of Budget and Management did not certify that sufficient
unencumbered funds are available in the department's budget, the judg-
ment would then have to be satisfied, if possible, from the second source,
the emergency purposes fund. Unlike the action in the previous stage,
there would be no discretion involved in attempting to pay the judgment
from the second source. The Office of Budget and Management would
have to apply to the controlling board2 44 for an appropriation from the
emergency purposes fund,2 45' and the board would have to comply with
the request if sufficient moneys existed in the fund. The fund is extreme-
ly large and contains substantial amounts of unrestricted funds.2 40  As a
practical matter the chances of this fund running dry are slim, and thus
claimants who successfully assert a claim over $1,000 would be much more
likely to be paid promptly under the provisions of the bill than under the
present sundry claims procedure.
If, however, the controlling board were unable to pay the judgment,
the defendant department would have to request that the General Assem-
bly make an appropriation sufficient to pay the judgment. Such a request
would have to be made each biennium until the appropriation is made.
While the General Assembly would remain free to refuse such a request,
such action would undoubtably have political consequences. It is much
more probable that the amount of the requested appropriation would be
included in the department's biennial budget. Even if forced to resort to
this last source of funds for satisfaction of the judgment, the successful
claimant would still be in much better position than if his claim were part
of the annual sundry claims bill. In both cases the claimant would not
receive any money until an appropriation were passed by the General
Assembly, but under the proposed Court of Claims Act the appropriation
would be less subject to political partisanship, because the legislature
must report all payments, reimbursements, etc. to the legislature biennially. WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.92.160 (Supp. 1973).
244 The controlling board controls the emergency purposes fund. It is created by the
biennial appropriations act. (Am. Sub. H. B. 86, § 25, 110th General Astembly Reg.
Sess. (1973)). It is composed of the Director of the Office of Budget and Management
or a designated employee of the office, the chairmen of the House and Senate finance commit.
tees, two members of the House, and two members of the Serate. It exercises all functions
of the emergency board created by OHIO REV. CODE ANN, §§ 127.01-04 (Page 1969).
Upon the vote of four members the board is empowered to authorize the release of moneys
in the emergency purposes fund to the various state departments. The board also has sub.
stantial power to transfer funds within a department.
24 5 The General Assembly appropriates money to the fund from the general revenue
fund and from some of the smaller funds. Some of the moneys so appropriated are limited
in how they may be used. See, e.g., Am. Sub. H. B. 86, § 20 at 138-39, 110th General
Assembly Reg. Sess. (1973) where funds are limited for compensation adjustment.
2 4 Am. Sub. H. B. 86, 110th General Assembly Reg. Sess. (1973) appropriated In
excess of $77 million to the fund. Of this amount over $9 million were not restricted,
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could be sure that the decision was based on legal, not political consid-
erations.
The bill carries the analogy of a state department defendant to a pri-
vate corporate defendant one step further by providing the director or
other administrative chief of any department, with the option of settling
any action against his department but this settlement or compromise would
first have to be approved by the attorney general.' The claimant's ac-
ceptance of such a compromise or settlement would be final and conclu-
sive upon the claimant and constitute a complete release of the state inso-
far as the particular department wer6 concerned. Once approved by the
attorney general, the claim would be paid in the same manner as judg-
ments against the state. 48
The settlement option would provide the director of the defendant
state department with the needed flexibility to fully and fairly defend the
total interest of the state, and thus represents a substantial advance over
the present sundry claims procedure. Since the department could be held
financially accountable for its judgments in much the same manner as
private defendants, the departmental director would have an incentive not
present in the sundry claims procedure to settle or compromise a claim. -"
Also, unlike the sundry claims procedure, in which a director's temptation
to admit liability or damages (the only form of 'settlement") for non-
legal reasons is checked only by a review by the board itself, the require-
ment that all settlements or compromises would have to be approved by
the attorney general should insure that any concessions by the state are
made primarily on the basis of legal considerations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity has long outlived whatever valid purpose it may
have had. It has resulted in injustice to the people of Ohio. This injus-
tice was only slightly lessened by the sundry claims procedure. In 1917
the creation of the Sundry Claims Board was a step forward for the State
of Ohio, but today, over half a century later, the Sundry Claims Board has
changed only slightly and remains the basic forum for redress of wrongs
committed by the State of Ohio. Fifty-seven years of experience have
proved that the sundry claims procedure is totally inadequate for the needs
of the people of Ohio. The relief afforded by the proposed Court of
Claims Act is long overdue. The Act would create a court system in line
2 47 Proposed OHIO REv. CODE § 2743.15(A).
248 Proposed OHIO REv. CoDE § 2743.15(B).
"49 Since the specific department nould not have to pay for its legal services (part of
the budget of the attorney general), as a private defendant would have to do, the relative
bargaining strength of the parties is not exactly the same as that between private parties.
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with the needs of a people who have an increasing exposure to state gov-
ernment in their daily lives. Its few defects could be easily remedied by
amendment, or by supplemental legislation. However, even without such
amendments its advantages far outweigh its defects. The Act would put
Ohio in the ranks of those progressive states which have abolished the an-
cient doctrine of sovereign immunity and have consented to suit in a
court of law.
Thomas W. Kahle
Stephen R. Schmidt
